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Interest rate ceilings are often considered as an effective way of preventing lenders from 
charging extortionate interest rates. However, setting the rates too low may cause 
institutions to fail to raise enough revenue to cover their costs. Low rates may pressure MFIs 
to reduce costs, increase loan sizes, withdraw services from areas where it is expensive to 
operate, or exit from the market altogether. A 42% interest rate ceiling was introduced in 
Zambia on the effective annual lending interest rate of MFIs in January 2013, which was 
later removed in November 2015. This research was aimed at investigating the effect of 
interest rate ceiling and microfinance direct costs on the financial sustainability of 
microfinance institutions in Zambia.  
 
The study used time series data from consolidated quarterly financial statements from 
March 2006 to September 2016 and employed Autoregressive Distributed Lags (ARDL) 
approach to analyse the effect of Yield on Gross Portfolio, Cost of Funds, Operating 
Expenses and Loan Loss provisions on Operational Self Sufficiency (OSS). OSS was used 
as a proxy for financial sustainability (dependent variable). Results of the time series 
analyses showed a positive and significant effect of Yield on Gross Portfolio and Cost of 
Funds on OSS in the long run. On the other hand, Operating Expenses and Loan Loss 
provisions had a negative relationship with OSS, albeit statistically insignificant.  
 
Trend analysis of the Yield on Gross Portfolio showed a downward trend and consequently 
the OSS also trended downwards, with the lowest OSS being recorded during the period 
interest rate ceilings were introduced. However, the trend showed that the microfinance 
sector was generally sustainable during the study period. The reduction in OSS following 
the introduction of the ceiling confirmed findings from prior studies regarding the negative 
impact of interest rate ceilings on the financial sustainability of MFIs.  
 
Although the study results showed that the MFIs were generally sustainable during the 
study period, it was evident that they were negatively impacted by the interest rate ceiling. 
Therefore the recommendation from this study is that interest rates must be set at levels 
where costs can be adequately covered. Furthermore, managing costs and loan delinquency 
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Microfinance refers to the provision of financial services to the poor, or people with low 
incomes who have no access to mainstream commercial bank services (Hudon & Sandberg, 
2015). The words “microfinance” and “microcredit” are sometimes used interchangeably. 
However, microcredit is “the provision of credit services to low-income entrepreneurs” 
while microfinance includes additional services such savings, money transfer, insurance, 
etc., in addition to providing credit (Elia, 2006).  
 
Microfinance was introduced upon the realisation that low income households can also 
benefit from accessing more broadly defined financial services such as savings (Armendáriz 
de Aghion & Morduch, 2005). According to Ledgerwood (1999), microfinance programs 
started in the 1980s. However, Elia (2006) noted that the actual concept was there as early 
as the 1970s. There has been substantial growth in microfinance since then (Ledgerwood, 
1999; Long & Marwa, 2015) and donors have been actively supporting MFIs that are 
devoted to achieving financial sustainability and extensive outreach. Growth has been 
fueled by a number of reasons such as “the promise of reaching the poor” by supporting 
income generation through their microenterprises and “the promise of financial 
sustainability” through establishing locally managed, subsidy-free and financially self-
sufficient (sustainable) institutions (Ledgerwood, 1999).  
 
The advent of microfinance led to the establishment of fully regulated and more 
commercially oriented institutions (Armendáriz de Aghion & Morduch, 2005). However, a 
number of recent research findings indicate that most countries exhibit consistently high 
microfinance loan interest rates (Hudon & Sandberg, 2015), compelling a number of 
governments to introduce interest rate ceilings (Duval, 2004). An interest rate ceiling is “a 
policy rate issued by a regulatory agency, limiting the maximum lending interest rate 
charged by financial institutions” (MicroFinance Transparency, 2016). While interest rate 
ceilings are often considered as an effective way of preventing lenders from charging 
unreasonably high interest rates, there have been arguments that setting the rates too low 




costs (Hug, 2014). Considering that a financially sustainable MFI is one which is able to 
“to cover all its expenses by its revenue and to generate a margin to finance its growth” 
(Ayayi & Sene, 2010), failure to generate enough revenue may compel MFIs to withdraw 
their services from operationally expensive areas, or exit the market altogether (Hug, 2014).  
 
In Zambia, interest rate ceiling was introduced in January 2013 following the “continued 
charging of exorbitant interest rates” by some Non-Bank Financial Institutions (NBFIs). 
The maximum effective annual interest rate for MFIs was set at 42% (Bank of Zambia, 
2013b).  The effective annual interest rate is “the total costs of borrowing expressed as an 
annual percentage rate”. Total cost of borrowing includes all known costs such as interest, 
commissions and fees relating to the credit agreement, costs of ancillary services in the 
process of providing credit, etc. (IMF, 2014). Following the decline in interest margins after 
the interest rate ceiling was introduced, some MFIs responded by implementing cost cutting 
measures. These included closures of marginal branches and adjusting their business 
models. Four (4) MFIs exited the sector following the introduction of the interest rate 
ceiling. However, the central bank continued receiving applications for setting up new MFIs 
(IMF, 2014). In November 2015, interest rate ceilings were removed by the Bank of Zambia 
and financial institutions were encouraged to be transparent when pricing credit products 
as well as to follow responsible and fair lending practices (Bank of Zambia, 2016). 
According to the Bank of Zambia (BOZ), maintaining the ceiling “wasn’t producing the 
actual outcome” but rather reduced the level of credit as some MFIs stopped lending (The 
Post, 2016).  
 
1.1 Research Area 
Interest rate ceiling has been a common approach by a number of countries in trying to 
resolve the problem of high lending interest rates. The “stock-taking exercise” which was 
undertaken by Maimbo and Gallegos (2014) found that 76 countries around the world were 
using some form of loan interest rate ceilings. This study is concerned with the relationship 
between interest rate ceiling and financial sustainability of MFIs in Zambia. Interest rate 
ceiling was introduced in January 2013 in Zambia but was later removed in November 2015. 
 
A number of studies have been done in the area of interest rate ceiling and financial 




structures of 216 MFIs in Bangladesh in order to determine whether the MFI’s will be able 
to achieve financial sustainability following the introduction of interest rate ceiling. They 
measured financial sustainability using ROA and OSS. Results of their study showed 
general administrative costs and interest rate spread as the two main factors that had a 
significant relationship with financial sustainability. Islam et al., (2014) concluded that 
MFIs with low administrative costs but with a large interest rate spread were most likely to 
attain financial sustainability even with the introduction of the interest rate ceiling.  
 
Campion et. al., (2010) examined interest rates and their determinants and found that 
interest rate ceilings reduced outreach in 29 MFIs located in seven countries. Similar results 
were found when Alshebami and Khandare (2015) reviewed the impact of interest rate 
ceilings on the microfinance industry. Alshebami and Khandare (2015) concluded that 
interest rate ceilings lead to credit shortage, limitation on the scope of operation for MFIs, 
reduced opportunities for the underprivileged to access loans, and a reduction in actual loan 
price transparency. Reduced loan pricing transparency and reduced access to financial 
services were also some of the findings after Helms and Reille (2004) examined the 
relationship between microfinance and interest rate ceilings. Helms and Reille (2004) found 
that ceilings make it difficult and sometimes impossible to cover costs and in extreme cases 
causes MFIs to be driven out of the market. The findings by Helms and Reille (2004) were 
aligned to those of Iezza (2010) who found that high loan interest rates were one of the 
statistically significant variables which influenced the MFIs’ long term financial self-
sufficiency. Acclassato (2006) also observed that financially sustainable MFIs in West 
Africa applied interest rates as high as 84%. Similarly, Hussien (2006) conducted an 
assessment of the relationship between outreach and financial sustainability of three 
Ethiopian MFIs and found low interest rates to be one of the major restraining factors to the 
attainment of financial sustainability. Contrary to the results of the above studies, Ek (2011) 
examined the key characteristics of financially sustainable MFIs and argued that the success 
of MFIs was not high interest rates but the ability to cut costs and ultimately charge less 
interest. These findings were in agreement with the study by Flosbach and Fellow (2013) 
who found that profitable MFIs were offering lower loan interest rates after examining the 
relationship between the profitability of MFIs and the interest charged to their clients.  
 
Helms and Reille (2004) noted that despite several arguments against interest rate ceilings 




cost of microfinance loans are still valid. As such, a number of countries still have interest 
rate ceilings in place. This was confirmed by the “stock-taking exercise” conducted by 
Maimbo and Gallegos (2014) who found that 76 countries around the world were using 
some form of loan interest rate ceilings. This therefore brings to the fore the necessity for 
continued studies in the area of interest rate ceiling and financial sustainability, apart from 
the mixed findings from previous studies. Furthermore, Marwa and Aziakpono (2015) 
noted that the most authoritative statement regarding the performance and sustainability of 
MFIs in the recent past is probably the one by Morduch (2000) that “less than 1% of MFIs 
are sustainable and no more than 5% will ever be”. Contrary to the assertion made by 
Morduch (2000), Marwa and Aziakpono (2015) observed that the empirical results from 
the research conducted by Gonzalez (2005) revealed that about 50% of MFIs attain 
sustainability between 5 and 10 years of being in operation. Marwa and Aziakpono (2015) 
therefore concluded that this controversy in the literature forms the basis for the need to do 
more empirical studies regarding the performance and sustainability of MFIs. Therefore, 
this research is aimed at investigating the effect which interest rate ceiling and microfinance 
direct costs could have had on the financial sustainability of Zambian MFIs. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Interest rate caps or ceilings are often considered as an effective way of preventing lenders 
from charging unreasonably high interest rates. However, setting the rates too low may 
cause financial service institutions to fail to raise enough revenue to cover their costs. Low 
rates may pressure MFIs to reduce costs, increase loan sizes, or withdraw their services 
from areas where it is expensive to operate or simply exit from the market altogether (Hug, 
2014). Therefore, interest rates must be set at levels where MFIs are able to cover all 
administrative and capital costs (including inflation), as well as loan losses, and a “provision 
for increasing equity”. Failure to cover these costs will cause MFIs to fail to reach many 
clients and operate for a limited time only since permanent financial services can only be 
provided by sustainable MFIs (Rosenberg, 2002). Accordingly, the Consultative Group to 
Assist the Poor (CGAP) through the “key principles of microfinance” it developed in 2004 
acknowledged that the poor need reasonably priced financial services. It also recognized 
that “financial sustainability is necessary to reach a significant number of poor people”, and 
that “interest rate ceilings can damage poor people’s access to financial services” (Alalade, 





The central bank of Zambia introduced an interest rate cap of 42% on the effective annual 
lending interest rate of MFIs in January 2013 in order to protect consumers from excessive 
interest rates. Just before the introduction of the cap, the average annual effective interest 
rates for MFIs were 120.8% and 115.5% during the first half and second half of 2012 
respectively (Bank of Zambia, 2013a). Miller (2013) noted that the introduction of interest 
rate caps in Zambia “reopened an old debate over the appropriateness of regulatory 
intervention to limit the charging of rates”. According to Agri-ProFocus Zambia (2014), 
“anecdotal evidence” indicated that Zambian MFIs were not able to cover their operational 
costs following the introduction of the interest rate cap causing them to scale down on their 
operations. The IMF (2015) article IV consultation staff report indicated that interest rate 
ceilings in Zambia were impeding access to finance, especially access by small and medium 
scale enterprises. The IMF (2015) noted that the level of the ceiling was particularly too 
low to adequately compensate for high operational costs and the credit risk relating to 
microenterprise loans. 
 
In May 2016, three Zambian NBFIs namely, Cetzam Financial Services, Commercial 
Leasing Zambia Limited and Genesis Finance Limited were declared insolvent and taken 
over by the central bank.  The former Chief Executive Officer of Cetzam Financial Services, 
one of the major deposit taking MFIs which was wholly owned by Zambians claimed that 
revenues for the individual institutions were “chocked” by the interest rate ceiling set by 
the central bank in 2013 (The Post, 2016).  In view of the foregoing, this research is aimed 
at investigating the effect of interest rate ceiling on the financial sustainability of 
microfinance institutions in Zambia. 
 
1.3 Objectives and Significance of the Research 
 
1.3.1 Objectives of the Research 
The objectives of the research were; 
1. To examine the effect of interest rate ceiling on financial sustainability of Zambian 
MFIs  
2. To examine the effect of microfinance direct costs on the financial sustainability 





1.3.2 Significance of the Research 
MFIs that are focused on helping their clients out of poverty should consider the 
significance of sustainability in fostering their Institutions’ continued existence to serve the 
poor. Furthermore, outside investors not only expect a financial return on their investments 
but also the efficient use of their resources. Therefore, most MFIs’ financial objectives are 
profitability and sustainability (Millson, 2013). 
According to Brouwers et al. (2014), the 2009 FinScope survey revealed that access to 
financial services by adult Zambians stood at only 37.3% while access to credit was only 
17.9%. Furthermore, much of the credit in Zambia is provided to those in formal 
employment through payroll loans representing 32% of the total credit portfolio for both 
MFIs and commercial banks.  Considering these low percentages and the potential effect of 
interest rate ceilings on the provision of financial services, it is imperative to conduct a 
study to investigate the effect of interest rate ceiling on the financial sustainability of 
microfinance institutions in Zambia.  
 
The study will also contribute to the ongoing debate regarding the implications of interest 
rate ceilings for MFIs as well as the presumably excessive MFI interest rates. Furthermore, 
apart from filling the gap by providing empirical evidence in literature since no such study 
has been conducted in Zambia before, the study will also benefit the regulators by enabling 
them understand the Zambian microfinance market further and thus implement appropriate 
regulatory measures. Microfinance practitioners will also benefit by understanding the 
implications of interest rate caps in Zambia thereby enabling them to implement appropriate 
management measures.  
 
The significance of studying financial sustainability was also pointed out by Ayayi and Sene 
(2010) who were of the view that since continued donor support cannot be guaranteed, only 
financial sustainability can lead to increased access to financial services by the poor and 









1.4 Research Questions and Scope 
The study sought to answer the following research questions; 
1. What is the effect of interest rate ceiling on the financial sustainability of Zambian 
MFIs? 
3. What is the effect of microfinance direct costs on the financial sustainability of 
Zambian MFIs? 
1.5 Research Assumptions 
The following were the assumptions used in this research; 
i. All the MFIs continued receiving the same undisclosed amount of subsidies if any 
during the period of study. 
ii. All the MFIs incurred financing costs, hence the inclusion of this cost in the formula 
for calculating OSS 
1.6 Organisation of the Study 
This study comprises five (5) chapters with the remaining chapters organized as follows; 
Chapter 2 provides the literature review. Chapter three (3) provides details of the research 
methodology; Chapter four (4) provides the research findings and analysis; Chapter five 























This chapter reviews the literature relating to the subject of interest rate ceiling and financial 
sustainability of MFIs. The chapter begins with the discussion of the Microfinance sector 
in Zambia. Theoretical issues relating to financial sustainability, the Welfarist and 
Institutionist approach, as well as the measures of financial sustainability are then discussed. 
The chapter further reviews the literature on interest rate ceiling including the rationale, 
forms, and impact of interest rate ceiling, after which the theoretical framework of this study 
is discussed. Lastly the chapter reviews empirical studies on financial sustainability. 
 
2.1 The Microfinance Sector in Zambia 
The microfinance sector in Zambia emerged in the 1990s at which time it was largely donor 
driven and concentrated in the urban areas. Most MFIs which were established in the early 
years of the microfinance sector’s formation heavily depended on government subsidies 
and targeted credit thereby rendering them susceptible to high default. A number of major 
providers of rural financial services which were sustained by the government collapsed in 
the nineties thereby leaving a huge gap in the provision of rural and agricultural financial 
services. This was exacerbated by the decision to close rural branches by commercial banks 
due to inadequate business and high costs associated with managing their rural branch 
networks (Agri-ProFocus Zambia, 2014). As of November 2016, the number of licenced 
MFIs were 34 according to the BOZ website. 
 
Currently the microfinance sector in Zambia is in the category of the formal Non-Bank 
Financial Institutions (NBFIs) and are regulated by BOZ under the Banking and Financial 
Services (Microfinance) Regulations Act of 2006 (Agri-ProFocus Zambia, 2014). The Act 
provides for both deposit taking and non-deposit taking MFIs. Deposit-taking MFIs are 
allowed to offer various other services such as savings, domestic money transfers, etc. 
(Arora et.al, 2012). In 2013, the Bank of Zambia re-categorised the MFI sector into the 
Enterprise Lending and Consumer lending MFIs. The Enterprise Lending category 
comprises MFIs whose exposure to micro-enterprises constitute 80% or more of total loans 





2.1.1 Recent Performance of the Zambian Microfinance Sector 
The historical performance of the microfinance sector has not been very good particularly 
due to high loan repayment defaults, relatively high operating costs and high client exit. 
The MFI sector was also affected by a limited scope of services, low savings mobilization, 
low outreach, and poor governance (Siwale & Ritchie, 2011).  
 
Performance in the recent past has, however, been generally fair. According to the Bank of 
Zambia (2016), the performance and overall financial condition of the Enterprise Lending 
MFIs in 2015 was fair. The sub sector’s capital position and asset quality was fair while the 
earnings performance was unsatisfactory having recorded a profit before tax loss of K12.2 
Million. Total assets declined by 3.8% mostly due to the adjustment of assets by one MFI 
whose license was revoked in 2015. The regulatory capital ratio was 16.2%, marginally 
above the 15.0% required minimum. The drop in the regulatory capital ratio was mainly 
due to the profit after tax loss of K10.8 million coupled with loan loss provisional 
adjustments for prior periods amounting to K35.6 million (Bank of Zambia, 2016).   
 
The overall Consumer Lending MFIs’ financial performance and condition was satisfactory 
in 2015. Total assets increased by 37.3% largely driven by a 41.7% increase in loans and 
advances to K2,635.5 million at the end of 2015 which were financed by shareholder loans 
and equity. The sub sector’s regulatory capital position was also rated satisfactory at 36.9%. 
In terms of earnings performance, consumer Lending MFIs were rated satisfactory in 2015. 
The profit before tax rose to K133.2 million from K38.5 million the previous year mainly 
due to the rise in interest income from K535.3 million the previous year to K887.4 million 
in 2015 (Bank of Zambia, 2016). 
 
2.2 Financial Sustainability 
Financial sustainability is the ability of an MFI to cover both direct costs and indirect costs 
with earned revenue (Ledgerwood, 1999). Ayayi and Sene (2010) defined financial 
sustainability as the capacity for an MFI “to cover all of its expenses by its revenue and to 
generate a margin to finance its growth”. Accordingly, an MFI attains financial 
sustainability when it is able to operate without the need for subsidies either in the form of 
donations or concessional loans (Ayayi & Sene, 2010).  However, income for MFIs is 




rate to be charged by the MFI, are imposed. Since microfinance costs are mainly covered 
by interest income (De Ridder, 2010), interest rate ceilings have a bearing on the financial 
sustainability of MFIs. 
 
2.2.1 The Institutionists and Welfarists Approach 
The institutionists believe that the effective way to fight poverty is to build an MFI industry 
that is able to reach a large number of people. This requires a huge amount of financial 
resources which donors may not be able to provide. Therefore, institutionists assume that 
donors cannot subsidize enough number of MFIs to enable them provide financial services 
to all their potential clients. According to the institutionists, the subsidy can be overcome 
by attracting private sources of capital which in turn requires MFIs to be profitable and 
sustainable. Accordingly, sustainable institutions are necessary if the main goal of MFIs is 
a substantial reduction of poverty. In this regard emphasis should be placed on breadth 
(number of clients reached) and not the depth (clients’ poverty level) of outreach. Failure 
to increase the number of clients reached would result into failure to reduce poverty. 
Conversely, the overall impact of targeting the poor with subsidized programs will be low 
due to limited and unstable donor funding (Elia, 2006). According to Elia (2006), the 
institutionist position has recorded success in the microfinance industry. Examples of 
successful MFIs, international institutions and networks which follow the institutionist 
approach include Banco Solidario (BancoSol) in Bolivia, Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI), the 
Grameen Foundation, ACCION International, the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor 
(CGAP), USAID, and the World Bank. Elia (2006) further noted that most of the 
microfinance literature follows the institutionist approach.   
 
Unlike the Institutionists approach, the focus of the welfarist approach is the depth (clients’ 
poverty level) and not so much the breadth (number of clients reached) of outreach and an 
ongoing acceptance of subsidies. Acceptance of subsidies is based on the concern that 
sustainability can put the accomplishment of the MFIs social mission at risk. The emphasis 
of the institutionists is on banking, while welfarists’ emphasis is on social goals. Financial 
self-sufficiency is recognized as important but is not considered necessary as the main 





2.2.2 Measures of Financial Sustainability 
According to Ayayi and Sene (2010), financial sustainability is measured by either the 
Subsidy Dependence Index (SDI) or the Financial Self-Sufficiency (FSS) index. UNCDF 
(2002) also discussed the OSS as another alternative measure of financial sustainability 
while some researchers also use the Return on Assets (ROA) (Kar, 2010).  
 
SDI quantifies an MFI’s subsidy dependence and measures the overall financial costs from 
the operations of an MFI. It is a measure of the microfinance social cost and thus indicates 
the minimum social benefit levels generated by the MFI (Manos & Yaron, 2008). 
 
OSS is the most basic measure of sustainability and focuses on revenues and expenses from 
the core business of the MFI (excluding donations and non-operating revenue) (Barres et. 
al., 2005). Ledgerwood (1999) noted the variation in the definition of OSS. One definition 
is the ability to generate “enough operating revenue to cover operating expenses, financing 
costs, and the provision for loan losses”. In this case OSS indicates whether or not sufficient 
revenue has been generated to cover the direct costs, including financing costs, but 
excluding the cost of capital. According to Barres et.al (2005), the OSS reflects the ability 
of an MFI to continue with its operations if no further subsidies are received since it focuses 
on cost coverage. The alternative definition excludes financing costs in the formula. The 
argument for excluding financing costs is that their inclusion makes the comparison of self-
sufficiency ratios between institutions less relevant since MFIs do not incur financing costs 
equally. This is because there are some MFIs whose loans are entirely funded through grants 
or concessional loans and therefore do not borrow funds or collect savings and thus they 
either do not incur any financing costs or they only incur minimal financing costs. Some 
MFIs access concessional or commercial borrowings as they progress towards financial 
viability in which case they incur financing costs. Proponents of the second definition 
therefore argue that since only operating and loan loss provision costs are incurred by all 
MFIs, MFIs should only be measured on the management of these costs. Ledgerwood 
(1999) advised that both formulas are correct and either of them can be used. The following 







𝑂𝑆𝑆 = 𝐹𝑅 ÷ (𝐹𝐸 + 𝐿𝐿 + 𝑂𝐸)             0.1 
         
Where FR = Financial Revenue, FE = Financial Expenses, LL = Loan Loss Provisions, OE 
= Operating Expenses. 
 
The significance of an MFI attaining Operational Self-sufficiency as spelt out by 
Ledgerwood (1999) is that MFIs that fail to attain Operational Self-sufficiency incur losses 
which ultimately reduce their equity (loan fund capital). This will mean only smaller 
amounts will be available to loan borrowers. The extreme case will be to close down the 
MFI once the funds completely run out. The only remedy when the MFI fails to attain 
Operational Self-Sufficiency is to source additional grants to cover operating shortfalls. 
MFIs must either increase their return on assets (yield) or reduce expenses relating to 
operations, financing or provision for loan losses. 
 
FSS is adjusted OSS (Barres et.al, 2005). It is a ratio of “adjusted operating income and 
adjusted operating expenses” (Marwa & Aziakpono, 2015).  Four adjustments affect FSS 
by increasing financial expense, impairment loan losses, and expense from operations. The 
“write off adjustment” is an exception since it has no effect both on the income and on 
expenses (Barres et.al, 2005). The adjustment is meant to show the MFI’s financial picture 
if funds were raised from the commercial market (on an unsubsidized basis) rather than 
through grants from donors or subsidized capital. Debt and customer deposits are also 
adjusted in order to reflect market rates. Furthermore, considering that the value of equity 
is eroded by inflation, financial equity balances are also adjusted for inflation. Other 
income, such as subsidies and in-kind cash are also adjusted accordingly (Marwa & 
Aziakpono, 2015).   
 
In summary, the difference between FSS and OSS is that apart from measuring the MFI’s 
ability to cover operating costs, FSS also measures the ability to maintain its equity value 
relative to inflation as well as being able to operate and expand without receiving subsidies. 
Generally, OSS is a measure of the ability to survive while FSS is an indicator of the ability 
to grow. MFIs are expected to aim at achieving an FSS ratio above 100 percent (Barres 




 𝐹𝑆𝑆 = 𝑂𝐼 ÷ (𝑂𝐸 + 𝐶𝐹 + 𝐿𝐿 + 𝐶𝐶)                      0.2 
                             
Where OI = Operating Income, OE = Operating Expenses, CF = Cost of Funds, LL = Loan 
Loss Provisions, and CC = Cost of Capital. 
The above formula takes into account both the cost of equity and cost of debt in cases where 
the MFI accessed concessional loans (at below market rates) (Iezza, 2010).  
ROA indicates the ability to use the MFIs total assets well in order to maximize profits 
(Kar, 2010). According to Islam et al. (2014), ROA is used to measure firm profitability 
and as such can be used as another proxy for sustainability. The following is the formula 
for calculating ROA adopted from Barres at.al (2005); 
   
𝑅𝑂𝐴 = (𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 − 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠) ÷ 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠                    0.3 
 
2.3 Microfinance Interest Rates 
According to Persky (2007), the word “interest” is defined as “the rental price of money” 
in modern economics. Its origins are closely linked to the changing meaning of “usury” 
which, in the middle ages, was commonly interpreted as “a loan repayment exceeding the 
principal amount”. The modern word “interest” is derived from the medieval Latin 
“interesse” which originally referred to a penalty for defaulting or making late payments on 
an otherwise legitimate and non-usurious loan. With the passage of time, the word “interest” 
became the standard term for genuine and accepted payments on loans (Persky, 2007). 
 
2.3.1 Microfinance Interest Schools of Thought 
Islam et al. (2014) discussed three schools of thought concerning MFI interest rate levels. 
The first school contends that the poor cannot afford market interest rates. As such interest 
on their loans must be charged at very low interest rates (between 1% and 3%) irrespective 
of the inflation rate. Islam et al. (2014) noted that such a model can only work with subsidies 
and is particularly endorsed by the western NGOs and their partners from developing 
countries. The second school of thought proposes MFI interest rates slightly below the ones 
charged by commercial banks. Proponents of this model include savings and credit unions 
and mutual societies. The third school is the one supported by organisations that promote 
managing microcredit by using effective rates to achieve financial sustainability. 
Microfinance practitioners who support this school of thought argue that interest rates must 




(Garrido et.al, 2007). For instance, CGAP (2004) supports interest rates that are higher than 
the ones for the banking sector but below the ones charged by informal borrowers such as 
loan sharks in order to guarantee financial sustainability.  
 
2.3.2 The High Microfinance Interest Rates Debate 
One major concern regarding MFIs has been the excessive interest rates, considering that 
the clientele have little or no bargaining power (Rosenberg et. al., 2013).  This is despite 
the fact that microfinance was created to protect the poor from excessive interest rates 
charged by informal money lenders (Skinner & Payne, 2010). Fernando (2006) observed 
that although the growth of the MFI industry has been greatly helped by high interest rates 
and millions of poor and low income people have been enabled to access credit, there are 
still many who cannot afford the high cost of such loans.  
 
Contrary to these criticisms, Rosenberg et. al. (2009) concluded that microfinance interest 
rates were generally reasonable with no evidence of widespread pattern of abuse after 
analysing 2006 MFI data from the Mix Market. However, their research did not use any 
theoretical framework or benchmark against which to judge what an excessive rate is and 
what it is not. Instead they formed their own intuitive judgment regarding reasonableness 
from available data. They also found that there was an annual decline of 2.3 percentage 
points in MFI interest rates since 2003, faster than bank interest rates. They therefore 
concluded that cases of excessively high interest rates that attracted condemnation were not 
representative of the entire microfinance industry.  
 
De Ridder (2010) noted that interest paid by clients is the main income for MFIs and 
therefore must be relatively high to cover costs. Similarly, Julien (2009) maintained that 
microfinance is like any other business and must operate profitably and sustainably and that 
countries with high MFI interest rates have had an expansion of operations and outreach to 
the poor and unbanked. Islam et al. (2014), however, cautioned that unreasonably high 
interest rates will penalise the clients which the MFI may in turn lose and thus undermine 
its social mission.  
  
Other arguments in favor of high MFI interest rates are that large geographies and small 
loan amounts result in high operational costs and risks (De Ridder, 2010), although Helms 




highly risky to lend to the poor clientele considering that good microcredit programs are 
often characterized by lower default rates compared to commercial banks. Rather, the high 
cost of microcredit is due to high delivery costs associated with small transactions. 
Rosenberg et. al. (2009) also explained that interest rates on MFI loans are often much 
higher than those for bank loans mainly because of comparatively higher costs when lending 
and collecting many tiny loans than lending and collecting a few large loans. These 
observations were also made by Fernando (2006) and Skinner and Payne (2010). Fernando 
(2006) observed that micro lending is a labour-intensive operation with high personnel and 
administrative costs. Loan recoveries are often executed by visiting clients thereby 
increasing costs due to time taken and transportation. Inflation also increases the cost of 
microfinance funds by “eroding microlenders’ equity” and thus pushes the nominal 
microcredit interest rates up (Fernando, 2006).  
 
High interest rates are also justified on the basis of the poor people’s ability to “afford” 
them. It is argued that poor people’s livelihoods often produce “windfall returns” thereby 
enabling them to afford high interest rates (De Ridder, 2010). The affordability of high MFI 
interest rates is also due to the fact that they are low in comparison to other alternatives such 
as local money lenders (De Ridder 2010; Sandberg 2012; Rosenberg et.al., 2009).  
 
2.3.3 Information Asymmetry, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard  
Lending institutions are subjected to the problem of information asymmetry to the degree 
that they lack information on the borrower’s usage of money lent as well as their ability and 
willingness to pay back. This risk can be absorbed by the lender’s interest rate, with a high 
interest rate justifiably corresponding to high risk. However, as the loan interest rate 
increases, the risk of default also grows. As such, financial institutions are only eager to 
charge high rates if they are sure that they will be able to recover the loans in the event of 
default (Armendáriz de Aghion & Morduch, 2005).   
 
An adverse selection problem happens when financial institutions fail to identify more risky 
customers whom they can charge more than what is charged to safer customers in order to 
compensate for the default probability. By not distinguishing riskier from less risk 
customers, interest rates may be raised for everyone with the resulting possibility of driving 




inability to ensure that borrowers fully apply themselves to ensure that their investment 
projects are successful. Moral hazard also comes from the possibility of borrowers trying 
to escape with the loaned funds.  The adverse selection and moral hazard problems can 
theoretically be eliminated by using cheap ways to gather and evaluate client information 
and enforcing contracts. However, the difficulty with this solution is the high transactions 
costs of processing many small loans (Armendáriz de Aghion & Morduch, 2005). 
 
2.4 Interest Rate Ceiling  
An interest rate ceiling is “a policy rate issued by a regulatory agency, limiting the 
maximum lending interest rate charged by financial institutions” 
(Microfinance Transparency, 2016).  
 
2.4.1 Forms of Interest Rate Ceiling  
According to Maimbo and Gallegos (2014), when loan interest rate ceilings are introduced, 
the scheme to be used, the “source of the rate-setting authority”, the legislation type, and 
the entity required to set the ceiling need to be defined. Further clarification also need to be 
made regarding the legal instruments to be used to establish the ceiling, whether the ceiling 
will only apply to interest rates or they will also apply to charges and other commissions, 
whether the ceiling will vary depending on the credit type, duration or any other criteria, 
and whether the ceiling will be absolute or relative. Additionally, clarification needs to be 
made where the rate is relative as to whether the benchmark will be exogenous or 
endogenous to the credit market, and whether the ceiling will be a “multiplication 
coefficient or a fixed margin over the benchmark rate”. Maimbo and Gallegos (2014) 
further elaborated the above issues as follows;  
 
Source of Authority: Based on the source of authority, an interest rate ceiling regime can 
either be in the form of usury limits, interest rate controls, or de facto ceilings.  Interest rate 
controls are commonly found in banking or central banking laws that authorise the 
regulators to set the maximum lending interest rates for regulated institutions. In most 
countries, the central bank sets the interest rate ceilings. Usury limits are commonly 
encoded into usury laws and they authorize a government agency to set interest rate limits 
for financial institutions. De facto ceiling is used by some countries where formal interest 
ceilings are not codified into law, even though interest rates are kept below specified levels 




Legal instruments: These are instruments commonly used to implement interest rate 
ceilings. They include usury laws, criminal or civil codes, consumer credit laws, 
microfinance laws, credit union acts, consumer credit laws, decrees, and banking laws. 
Zambia used the banking laws to set the interest rate ceiling (Maimbo & Gallegos, 2014).   
 
Criteria: The criteria specifies what is to be capped and includes clarification as to whether 
fees and commissions are to be considered part of the interest rate. Maimbo and Gallegos 
(2014) found three types of interest where a ceiling is applied namely, the annual percentage 
rate, the nominal interest rate, and the effective interest rate.  Of these, the effective interest 
rate was the most commonly used. This is the “interest rate that covers all financial costs 
(such as interest rates, fees, and commissions) expressed as a percentage of the loan used 
during each payment period” This is the definition which was adopted by Zambia to 
determine the ceiling. The annual percentage rate (APR) is the “effective interest rate 
multiplied by the number of periods in a year” and therefore it also takes into account all 
fees and commissions. The nominal interest rate is less frequently used. It denotes the “rate 
to be paid on a loan contract” and does not therefore include commissions, fees or other 
expenses (Maimbo & Gallegos, 2014).   
 
Unique or Different Ceilings: During their study Maimbo and Gallegos (2014) found that 
most countries that had interest rate ceilings implemented different ceilings on the type of 
credit, the amount of credit to be extended, the credit duration, or a combination of these. 
Different ceilings were also imposed depending on the type of institution were the loan was 
made. Some countries also used unique interest rate ceilings where unique ceilings are set 
on, for instance, only for microloans, consumer loans, the microfinance sector etc.   
 
Methodologies: Two different criteria may be applied when countries decide to set a ceiling 
on loan interest rates. These are the absolute ceiling (fixed nominal rate) or the relative 
ceiling (calculated against a benchmark rate). When a relative ceiling is applied a choice 
must be made between a “reference rate in the credit market in practice (endogenous) or a 
base rate such as the interbank refinancing rate (exogenous)”. A choice must also be made 
between using a “multiplication coefficient or a fixed margin over the reference rate”. 
Normally, multiplication coefficients are expressed as “x times the benchmark rate or as x 
percent over the benchmark rate” while fixed margins are expressed as the “benchmark rate 




approach of linking the interest ceiling to the base rate which has been set by the central 
bank implies that the ceiling moves according to market conditions, that is, it rises and falls 
with monetary tightening and easing respectively. According to Miller (2013), this is the 
model which was adopted in Zambia where banks were lending at nine percentage points 
above the policy rate while the pricing for MFI lending was a multiple of this. 
 
2.4.2 The Rationale for Interest Rate Ceiling  
Interest rate ceilings are used by governments for various economic and political reasons 
such as the need to support a specific industry or economic area. For instance the 
government may identify a market failure in a particular industry, or it may want to shift a 
greater focus of financial resources towards a particular sector than the market would 
determine on its own (Miller, 2013). Interest rate ceilings may also be justified on the basis 
of excessive profits by financial institutions due to exorbitant interest rates. For instance, 
Sandberg (2012) noted that prior to the debate around the high interest rates charged by 
bank Compartamos of Mexico in 2007, compulsory interest rate ceilings had been 
introduced in more than 40 developing countries in order to address “usurious” MFI pricing 
practices. According to Miller (2013), usurious pricing signifies market failure and 
therefore warrants the need for the government to intervene in order to protect borrowers.  
 
According to Reifner, Clerc-Renaud, and Knobloch (2009), the underlying philosophy of 
interest rate restrictions corresponds to the following three distinct goals; 
i. The ethical and religious concept of preventing exploitation 
ii. The market concept of regulating prices when competition is either inadequate 
to do so or does not produce the desired impact on the vulnerable 
iii. Regulating credit products considered to be detrimental to the economy 
Ramsay (2010) discussed the following rationales for interest rate ceilings;  
i. reacting to “behavioural mistakes” in cases where consumers seemingly 
underestimate the risks of expensive credit  
ii. providing a “bright line rule” significantly higher than the market rate in order 
to reduce the high costs of exploitation or proving fraud in credit markets  
iii. addressing market competition problems leading to supra normal prices  
iv. preventing externalities such as costs of support by the state towards borrowers 




v. ensuring fair transaction prices 
vi. providing “cross-subsidisation” of higher risk borrowers by lower risks thereby 
demonstrating social solidarity 
 
2.4.3 Arguments against Interest Rate Ceilings  
Notwithstanding the above justifications, literature and empirical evidence also provides 
arguments against interest rate ceiling. Ramsay (2010) argued that interest rate ceilings are 
a “blunt and over-inclusive instrument” because not all loans with high interest rates are to 
be perceived as unfair or lead to over indebtedness and not all consumers may underestimate 
the risks associated with expensive credit. Bowsher (1974) observed that interest rate 
ceilings are “relics of ancient and medieval thought” which have continued to the present 
day mainly due to lack of confidence in market forces or because of assumed benefit to 
higher credit risks. According to Bowsher (1974), indications from history are that the main 
forces which were in reality keeping interest rates at existing levels were the supply and 
demand for funds and not interest rate controls. (Paul, 2009) contended that interest rate 
ceilings are targeted at the symptom instead of the cause of high interest rates namely, high 
operating costs. Interest rate ceilings can therefore cause lenders to incur losses if the ceiling 
is set below what is appropriate for cost recovery (Skinner & Payne, 2010).  
 
If the interest rate restrictions reduces the overall volume of credit, the implication is to 
distribute overheads to a lower number of total credit thereby increasing the average rate of 
interest (Reifner et. al., 2009). Likewise, Miller (2013) revealed that past evidence from 
some developed markets has shown that interest rate ceilings can actually lead to an increase 
in the level of interest rates. In Colorado for instance, although a study of payday loans 
showed that the imposition of a price ceiling initially reduced interest rates, interest rates 
steadily rose towards the interest rate cap in the long run. The explanation for this was 
implicit collusion, by which a focal point was set by the price ceiling such that lenders knew 
that price rises would be limited and hence the natural collusive behavior (Miller, 2013). 
Staten (2008) noted, however, that interest rates do not necessarily reach the regulatory 
ceiling and are not very likely to do so as the ceiling rises. Rather, the forces that enables 
credit to be available at prices proportionate to the costs and risks of credit provision are the 
well-informed consumers and free entry of new competitors. Existing creditors’ pricing 
power is kept in check by the threat of being undercut by competitors. However, interest 




imposition of a ceiling on lending in Bolivia led to a notable reduction in the licensing of 
new entities thereby posing the risk of increasing the potential for exploitative lending and 
inability to offer consumer protection (Miller, 2013). 
 
2.4.3.1 Interest Rate Ceiling and Price Elasticity of Demand  
According to Karlan and Zinman (2008), the prescription by some policymakers for MFIs 
to increase interest rates in order to avoid subsidies is only logical if the poor are not 
sensitive to interest rate changes, in which case MFIs will be able to attain sustainability 
without reducing the poor’s ability to access credit. Accordingly, Karlan and Zinman (2008) 
tested the assumption of price inelastic demand through randomized trials in South Africa 
and found downward sloping demand curves which were steeper for price increases. 
Demand sensitivity rose sharply at prices higher than the lender’s standard rates, and 
repayments also reduced. This implied that even small interest rate increases would bring 
about a substantial reduction in credit demand. Similar findings were r ecorded by Dehejia 
et. al (2012) after examining demand patterns of MFI loan interest rate increases in the 
slums of Dhaka in Bangladesh using SafeSave microfinance records. Results indicated that 
borrowers are sensitive to interest rate increases and they tend to take smaller and frequent 
loans, and making quick repayments leading to reduced overall loan balances. Loan demand 
was found to recover over the longer term, although four years later it was still not back to 
the same level as before the interest rate hike.   
 
Similarly, Karlan and Zinman (2016) examined the long run price elasticities of demand 
for credit in Mexico. Working with Compartamos Banco to estimate the general-
equilibrium, long-run, and short-run price elasticities, they used randomized interest rates 
across 80 regions and found long-run demand to be price elastic, with elasticities growing 
over time. The number of borrowers was also elastic. According to Karlan and Zinman 
(2016), long-run elasticities may be different from short-run elasticities. On the borrower 
side, it may take time for clients to learn about new rates and adjust their choice sets or 
production functions (fixed costs change to variable in the long-run). 
 
Given the forgoing study results, Karlan and Zinman (2008) argued that this kind of 
responsiveness to interest rate changes by the poor is an indication that usurious lending 




2.4.3.2 Impact of Interest Rate Ceilings on Microfinance Outreach 
Historically, MFIs have been able to fund their network expansion and rapidly expand 
outreach using profits from existing borrowers. Ceiling interest rates can therefore 
negatively affect outreach since MFIs may remain profitable in their current markets but 
reduce investment in new markets (Miller, 2013). Fernando (2006) submitted that outreach 
expansion has been taking place in environments where institutions have the liberty to 
determine interest rates based on their institutional and market factors. “Cross-
subsidisation” or credit exclusion for some consumers in cases where lenders decide to exit 
the market will thus hurt most low income borrowers despite being the intended 
beneficiaries of the ceilings (Ramsay, 2010). This was the case in Nicaragua where MFIs 
and commercial banks withdrew from some locations following the introduction of the 
Microfinance Association Law in 2001 which restricted microloan interest rates (Miller, 
2013). Interest rate ceilings were also among the obstacles to the proliferation of 
microfinance in Latin America (Skinner & Payne, 2010).  According to Fernando (2006), 
the proposition that liberal interest rate policies foster the growth of the microfinance 
industry was supported by empirical evidence from the Asia and Pacific region as more 
than fifty million poor people were able to access microcredit both from formal and semi-
formal institutions. On the other hand, outreach was low in countries where markets were 
mainly characterised by interest rate ceilings such as Viet Nam and China.  
 
While MFIs may not be as willing or able to expand their operations due to interest rate 
ceiling, potential investors may consequently also be discouraged from supporting the 
microfinance industry (Fernando, 2006).  
 
2.4.3.3 Impact of Interest Rate Ceilings on MFIs’ Transparency  
Interest rate restrictions may lead to the reduction in the interest margin which may in turn 
cause the lender to consider other sources of income in order to meet the required return 
(Reifner et. al., 2009). Lenders may opt to recover the shortfall on their required return 
through higher fees on unregulated margins such as prepayment penalties, higher 
application fees, or elevated charges (Staten, 2008). Thus, ceilings may lead to reduced 
transparency as MFIs attempt to evade the ceiling by charging higher interest rates through 
hidden fees and complex interest structures (Paul, 2009 ) which may have adverse 




and more expensive forms of credit (Ramsay, 2010).  For instance, Skinner and Payne 
(2010) noted that some of the lenders in Ecuador attempted to “end-run” interest rate ceiling 
by charging assorted fees in addition to the specified interest rate. Effectively, this resulted 
into a rise in loan interest rates since the borrower would have to pay back the principal, 
interest and the fees at the end of the loan term. This practice, known as “fee shifting”, 
enabled lenders to technically comply with interest rate ceiling while effectively receiving 
higher interest rates from loans.  
 
2.4.3.4 Impact of Interest Rate Ceilings on Credit Supply 
Staten (2008) noted that warnings that loan supply would contract and the cost of borrowing 
increase because of interest rate ceilings can be traced as far back as 300 years to the time 
of John Locke who predicted a reduction in the supply of credit as a result of lowering the 
usury ceiling from 6% to 4% in 1691. According to Fernando (2006), interest rate ceilings 
may reduce the creditworthiness of MFIs, reduce their ability to access funds from the 
market to finance operations, and induce a reduction in credit supply.  
 
The buffer between the borrower’s income and essential expenses has to be large enough 
to assure the lender that the likelihood of loan default is less. Since lenders are often faced 
with a high default risk when lending to low income customers due to their small buffer, a 
higher interest rate is usually charged to the low income borrowers compared to other 
customers in order to compensate for the high risk. This kind of price discrimination is 
considered efficient from an economic perspective and is envisaged to maximise credit 
supply in the market (Reifner et. al., 2009). On the other hand, interest rate ceilings 
exacerbate the adverse selection problem as they restrict the ability of lenders to price 
discriminate (Miller, 2013). If interest rate restrictions are enforced, financial institutions 
will only be able to charge interest rates which can compensate up to a specific risk level. 
Beyond this risk level, credit will not be provided to all customers at the maximum legal 
rate of interest (Reifner et. al., 2009). This is because low interest rate ceilings prevent the 
flow of credit to higher risk individuals and businesses as available funds tend to be 
channeled towards well established functions with low risk (Bowsher, 1974). Therefore 
entrepreneurs who might need to access more expensive credit for their riskier business 
ventures may not have access to such funds (Miller, 2013). As a result, innovation is 




Apart from reasons relating to the likelihood of default as elaborated above, some of the 
higher risk borrowers are rationed out of the market because the cost of servicing them 
become relatively higher than the revenue received when interest rate ceilings are set. Also, 
competition prevents lenders from subsidizing high risk borrowers through increased 
charges to low risk borrowers (Staten, 2008).  Lenders can decide to ration their credit 
supply either by eliminating some borrowers, or by giving out lower amounts to all the 
borrowers, or a combination of credit rationing and a reduction in credit amounts (Ashta et. 
al., 2013). Ledgerwood (1999) and Fernando (2006) observed that when reliable credit is 
scarce and desirable, credit tend to be predominantly allocated to those with the influence 
to obtain them, side-lining those who need smaller loans. Staten (2008) noted that in most 
cases, excluded customers are the young, those who are not very old on their job or at their 
residence, unskilled workers, low income earners, people with few assets, and those with 
short or irregular credit histories. All these have attributes that tend to increase the creditor’s 
risk and projected costs. In other words, the ones who are often rationed out of the market 
are the financially vulnerable who are in fact the very consumers interest rate ceilings were 
apparently intended to protect. The graph in figure 2.1 below depicts the impact of interest 
rate ceiling on the supply of credit. 
 









Point E represents the equilibrium between the demand curve and supply curve of 
microloans when there are no interest ceilings while “a” is the total amount of loans at r* 
rate of interest. An interest ceiling of ru prevents equilibrium E from taking place. At interest 
rate ru, the maximum credit supply is limited to b whereas the quantity demanded moves to 
c. Thus the difference between “c” and “b” represents unsatisfied demand (consumer 
surplus) (Ashta et. al., 2013). Imposing a maximum loan price increases the adverse 
selection problem as the resulting consumer surplus is a larger pool of willing borrowers 
whose creditworthiness is unidentifiable (Miller, 2013). An artificially high microcredit 
demand relative to supply which would be created by interest rate ceilings may 
subsequently create opportunities for rent seeking (Fernando, 2006).  
 
2.4.3.5 Impact of Interest Rate Ceilings on Savings  
According to Ledgerwood (1999), a liberalized financial sector, without interest rate 
ceilings, promotes effective savings mobilization by MFIs. Furthermore, Ledgerwood 
(1999) considered interest rate ceilings as one of the regulations that lead to financial 
repression (distortion of financial markets and induction of inefficiency in financial 
institutions) thereby creating an environment which is not conducive to financial 
intermediation. Correspondingly, Bowsher (1974) contended that small savers are 
negatively affected by interest rate controls by denying them the right to a competitive 
return on their funds. This is because interest rate ceilings on microcredit will cause deposit 
taking MFIs to reduce their deposit rates thereby negatively affecting savers (Fernando, 
2006). Bowsher (1974), noted that unlike small savers, savers with large amounts can easily 
go around the controlled market by investing in capital markets and uncontrolled central 
money. Savers may also not be willing to place deposits with the deposit taking MFIs 
considering that the profitability and viability of MFIs is depressed by interest rate ceilings 
which may jeopardise funding for MFIs (Fernando, 2006). Table 2.1 below outlines some 










Table 2.1: General Impact of Interest Rate Ceilings on Microfinance Interest Rates 
   
The Supply Side The Demand Side 
Short Term 
 Lenders forced to reduce interest rates 
 Rent-seeking incentives among lending 
staff created by excess demand creates 
 Reduction in viability of lending to the 
poor  
 Profits on loans to the poor reduced 
 Reduction in incentives to lend to the poor  
 Reduction in incentives to increase 
investments aimed at expanding loans to 
the poor 
 Increase in policy risk on lending to the 
poor (possibility of new ceilings) 
 Potential investors receive negative signal  
 Increase in risk of lending to microlenders  
 Reduction in incentives for commercial 
banks to enter the microcredit market  
Short Term 
 Increase in demand for loans at 
the ceiling rate 
 New clients seek loans at new 
rates 
 Creation of an excess demand for 
loans at the ceiling rate 
 Reduction in price of credit to 
some who get loans  
 Higher transaction costs paid by 
some borrowers than before 
Medium to Long Term  
 Creditworthiness for microlenders’ reduced 
 Increase in price at which microlenders can 
borrow from the market  
 Decline in microlenders’ profits  
 Decline in the supply of donor funds 
 Some of the lenders exit the market 
 Decline in loan supply to the poor  
 Quality of service to the poor declines 
 Reduction in interest rates on the poors’ 
deposits  
 Transaction costs of small deposits 
increased 
 Decline in the supply of other financial 
services to the poor  
Medium to Long Term  
 Some of the borrowers move to 
informal markets 
 Some of the former borrowers 
become worse off due to the 
decline in credit supply 
 Increase in loan defaults  
 
 






2.5 Theoretical Framework - Determinants of Microfinance Interest Rates 
Interest income covers MFI costs. The difference between the MFIs’ costs and their income 
is profit (or loss) simplified by the following equation (Rosenberg et. al., 2013); 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 = 𝐶𝐹 + 𝐿𝐿 + 𝑂𝐸 + 𝑃                  0.4 
   
Where CF = Cost of Funds, LL = Loan Loss Expense, OE = Operating Expense, P = Profit 
 
Interest income moves up or down with changes in one or more of the factors on the right 
side of the above equation (Rosenberg et. al., 2013). In line with the above equation, 
consumer credit interest rates are composed of four elements namely a compensation for 
default risk, the market interest rate, the profit margin, and operational costs (Reifner et. al., 
2009). Miller (2013) discussed these four components under the headings of cost of bad 
debts, cost of funds, profit margin, and overheads (administrative costs) respectively. 
 
      Figure 2.2: Components of Interest Rates 
 
                                              











Source: Adopted from Miller (2013) 
 
The cost of funds is the amount that the institution pays when it borrows funds that it in turn 
lends out (Miller, 2013). MFI loans are funded using a combination of equity (owner’s 
money) and debt (funds borrowed from depositors or external lenders). Borrowed funds 
involve an interest expense while equity may be free if the MFI is not for profit and therefore 
does not have shareholders to be paid dividends (Rosenberg et. al., 2013). For deposit taking 





such as non-deposit taking MFIs, the cost of funds could also be the cost of wholesale funds 
or a subsidised rate on funds provided by donors or the government (Miller, 2013).  
 
Overhead costs include expenses such as salaries, taxes, regulatory fees, legal fees 
associated with collections, rents, property insurance charges, depreciation, utilities, vehicle 
maintenance, fuel expenses, and any other business expenses (Campion et. al., 2010). Miller 
(2013) grouped these costs into three broad categories namely, general administration and 
overheads which relate to running the branches and other offices, the cost of processing and 
assessing loans, and outreach costs. Campion et. al., (2010) submitted that all of these 
expenses have to be met using income from lending if the operations of an MFI are to be 
sustainable. Rosenberg et.al. (2013) noted that operating expenses are usually the largest 
determinant of the interest rate charged since much of the MFIs’ loan income is spent on 
them. One of the empirical studies in support of the assertion by Rosenberg et. al. (2013) 
was the study conducted by Hudgens (2011) were operating expenses were found to be the 
main drivers of interest rates.   
 
An allowance for non-performing loans (NPLs), i.e. the cost of bad debts, must also be 
written off by lenders in the rate they charge (Miller, 2013). This is because most MFI loans 
are either not secured by any collateral or they are secured by collateral which cannot cover 
a defaulted loan amount after taking into account the collection expenses. Also, poor 
households often lack documented repayment history (Campion et. al., 2010).   
 
When loan repayments are behind by several repayment periods or something puts the 
eventual loan collection in doubt, sound accounting practice requires booking the relevant 
amount as a loan loss provision expense in order to reflect the reduced possibility of 
collecting in full. By so doing, the probable loan losses are promptly recognized. In the 
event that the loan which was earlier booked as a provision expense is later fully recovered, 
the lender will at that point simply reverse the provision expense (Rosenberg et. al., 2013).  
Everything else being equal, a high number of nonperforming loans and related provisions 
leads to a lower profit margin. Higher loan losses will in turn necessitate raising the MFI 
interest rates in order to maintain the desired profit margin. If MFI regulations require a 
high level of loan loss provisioning despite very low default rates, compliance will raise the 





Another component of interest rates is the profit margin (Miller, 2013). Profit is the 
difference between income and expenditure amounts (Rosenberg et. al., 2013). Campion 
et. al., (2010) noted that the ability to determine appropriate profit levels is at the core of 
the debate regarding the MFIs’ interest rate setting. Adequate profits enable MFIs not only 
to recover their costs but also to increase their capitalization. Because shareholders or 
investors for profit oriented MFIs normally expect a certain level of return, the interest rates 
charged tend to naturally be higher than those for nonprofit MFIs. Although nonprofit MFIs 
may not necessarily need to generate above cost revenue to the same level as for profit 
MFIs, they also need to increase their capital base for them to be able to fund investments 
and thus improve their performance and growth. One of the findings from the study 
conducted by Hudgens (2011) was that the MFI’s profit status had significant effects on 
interest rates especially in developed microfinance markets. On the other hand, Rosenberg 
et. al. (2009) found that profits were not a predominant determinant of interest rates and 
contended that in the unlikely and unrealistically extreme scenario of completely 
eliminating all profit, the interest rate for the average MFI would only drop by about one 
sixth which would still leave MFI interest rates at seemingly abusive levels to those who do 
not understand the high costs involved in small loans. The study by Campion et. al. (2010) 
also showed trends of lower interest rates being charged by for profit MFIs. 
 
Skinner and Payne (2010) pointed out that in the typical microfinance context, additional 
factors contribute to the interest rate. These include business type, competition, local market 
rates, repayment frequency, and loan size. Campion et. al., (2010) discussed some of the 
specific external factors that contribute to high MFI interest rates such as the lack of 
macroeconomic stability, poor infrastructure, and political and other risks. Regarding 
macroeconomic instability, Campion et. al. (2010) noted that average domestic financial 
market interest rates tend to rise when a country continually finances a growing debt due to 
a large public deficit. This affects the cost of funds for financial institutions and contributes 
to inflationary pressures. Similarly, a country having problems with its balance of payments 
may have its currency depreciate and microfinance operators with foreign debts may raise 
their interest rates to avoid “unhedged foreign indebtedness”. Both lenders and borrowers 
are also susceptible to inflation uncertainty. A sudden spike in inflation can affect loan profit 
margins (Skinner & Payne, 2010). Therefore, interest rates must also account for the effects 
of inflation in order to maintain the purchasing power of loanable capital. Thus, all else 




macroeconomic factors, challenges relating to poor physical infrastructure such as sporadic 
and unreliable electricity services, poor road network, poor and expensive internet 
connectivity etc., also contributes to high client outreach costs and consequently high 
interest rates. Furthermore, changes in the rules, policies, and regulations relating to 
financial operations may sometimes increase MFI costs (Campion et. al., 2010). 
Based on the foregoing literature review, this study conceptualizes a framework linking the 
variables as in figure 2.3 below: 
 
Figure 2.3: Conceptual relationship between the dependent and independent variables 
  
   Independent Variables             Dependent Variable   











    
Source: Author 
 
2.6 Review of Empirical Studies on Financial Sustainability 
Iezza (2010) showed that high loan interest rates contribute to sustainability after examining 
MIX market data for 687 MFIs based in 63 countries in order to study the determinant 
factors of financial self-sufficiency. The study found several variables which together 
influenced the MFIs’ long term financial self-sufficiency. These variables included the 
capital structure, the collection of client deposits, inflation, and lending interest rates. Other 
significant factors included low portfolio at risk, low non-earning liquid assets, and Yield 
on Gross Portfolio. The latter suggested that high loan interest rates contribute to 
sustainability. Other studies in which the Yield on Gross Portfolio was positively related to 
microfinance financial sustainability was the quantitative research conducted by Woldeyes 
(2012) using panel data regression on the six years mix-market secondary data for twelve 











Ethiopian MFIs, and the study by Marwa and Aziakpono (2015). Marwa and Aziakpono 
(2015) examined the financial sustainability as well as the profitability of Tanzanian Saving 
and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs) using the 2011 audited financial reports. ROA was used 
to estimate profitability while the ratio of total expenses to total revenue was used to 
estimate financial sustainability. Investigation of the determinants of financial sustainability 
using linear regression revealed that about 61% of SACCOs from the sample were 
operationally sustainable and 51% were both operationally and financially sustainable. The 
relationship between yield on gross loan portfolio and both OSS and FSS were found to be 
positive and significant while cost per client, administrative expenses per borrower, and 
average disbursed loan size did not affect OSS and FSS. Furthermore, Nyamsogoro (2010) 
studied factors that affected financial sustainability of MFIs in rural Tanzania by way of a 
quantitative research approach with FSS as the dependent variable.  Panel data regression 
was used as the main technique during data analysis based on primary and secondary data 
spanning 4 years for 98 Tanzanian rural MFIs. Nyamsogoro (2010) found that interest rates 
charged, cost per borrower, and yield on gross loan portfolio, among other factors, affected 
financial sustainability of rural MFIs in Tanzania.  
 
The other studies in support of high interest rates were the ones conducted by Islam et al. 
(2014) and Ayayi and Sene (2010) both of which were aimed at identifying the determinants 
of sustainability. Islam et al. (2014) examined the cost structures for 215 MFIs from the 
Microcredit Regulatory Authority of Bangladesh. They used management accounting ideas 
and frameworks, primarily contingency theory during the identification of MFI’s cost 
structure components. The results indicated general administrative costs and interest rate 
spread as the two key factors that were significantly related to financial sustainability. 
Specifically, the study endeavored to predict the impact of MFIs’ cost structure on OSS as 
a proxy for sustainability or the survival of an MFI if an interest rate ceiling is introduced. 
Their conclusion was that MFIs with lower administrative costs and larger interest rate 
spreads were more likely to attain sustainability and “survive the interest rate cap”. Ayayi 
and Sene (2010) used data from the MIX Market database for 217 MFIs located in 101 
countries to examine the factors that determine the financial sustainability of MFIs. The 
data used was distributed by region and MFI type and covered a 9 year period from 1998 
to 2006. Regions covered included Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America-Caribbean region, 
and Eastern Europe-Central Asia. Financial sustainability was the dependent variable while 




the conclusions from the study was that a high quality credit portfolio, combined with the 
application of high enough interest rates that can give a reasonable profit are key to the 
financial sustainability of MFIs.  
 
Similarly, Hussien (2006) conducted an assessment of the relationship between outreach 
and financial sustainability of three Ethiopian MFIs namely, OMO Micro Finance 
Institution (OMFI), Sidama Micro Finance Institution (SMFI) and Addis Credit and Saving 
Institution (AdCSI). Both qualitative and quantitative methods were used to analyse 
financial performance. Hussien (2006) collected primary data through semi structured 
questionnaires and observations while secondary data was extracted from audited financial 
statements. The study results showed that the three MFIs attained widespread outreach with 
significant growth in the savings volumes as well as the gross loan portfolio. However, all 
the sample MFIs had not attained financial self-sufficiency. Major restraining factors to the 
attainment of widespread outreach and financial sustainability included low interest rates.  
 
Mwangi (2014) and Lupia (2014) conducted studies in Kenya to determine whether there 
is a relationship between lending interest rates and the financial performance of MFIs. 
Results for both studies showed a strong positive relationship between lending interest rates 
and financial performance of MFIs. The study by Mwangi (2014) involved analyzing 
secondary data from Central Bank of Kenya, nine deposit taking MFIs and the Association 
of Microfinance Institutions.  The data spanning a period of five years (from 2009 to 2013) 
was analyzed using the multivariate regression model. Lupia (2014) investigated the 
relationship between interest rates and financial performance of Kenyan MFIs by applying 
multiple regression analysis on secondary data from published reports for 24 MFIs. ROA 
was the dependent variable while independent variables used were the interest rates, 
Inflation, and 91-Day Treasury bill rate. Apart from influence of the rate of inflation on 
financial performance, Lupia (2014) also found a positive relationship between interest 
rates and financial performance of Kenyan MFIs. Similarly, Kar and Swain (2014) 
conducted an investigation as to whether profitability is improved by the high MFI interest 
rates, and whether the high rates also lead to the reduction in repayment rates and mission 
drift. A global panel database for 379 MFIs from 71 countries spanning 6 years (from 2003 
to 2008) was used in the investigation. The study hypothesised a link between FSS, loan 
delinquency and MFI portfolio yield. Results showed the real yield on loan portfolio (the 




performance and loan repayment rates for MFIs. In addition, individual-based lenders who 
charged higher interest rates were found to be more profitable compared to others. However, 
this was only up to a certain level, beyond which the MFIs profitability tended to be worse. 
Kar and Swain (2014) concluded that their findings were in line with agency cost theory 
predictions which posits that “the lenders’ loan delinquency rates increase with the interest 
rates that they charge to their loan clients”. Furthermore, Cull et. al. (2006) examined 
profitability, cost reduction, and loan repayment patterns for 124 organisations in 49 
countries. They found a positive and significant coefficient for real gross portfolio yield 
across three profitability indicators namely, Return on Assets, Operational Sustainability, 
and Financial Self-Sufficiency. Arising from this, their conclusion was that there was a 
relationship between raising interest rates and improved financial performance for 
“individual-based lenders”.  Similar results were obtained by Long and Marwa (2014) 
regarding portfolio yield in their study to establish the drivers of financial sustainability for 
25 Ghanaian MFIs using a six year unbalanced panel secondary dataset (from 2006 to 2011) 
from the MIX Market. They used panel data regression analysis with FSS as the proxy for 
financial sustainability (dependent variable). Their econometric results indicated that the 
administrative efficiency ratio and the Yield on Gross Portfolio were positively related to 
sustainability of microfinance institutions.  
 
Similar results and conclusions to the studies by Long and Marwa (2014), Cull et. al. (2006), 
and Kar and Swain (2014) were found in a more recent study by Beg (2016) which was 
aimed at determining the factors impacting financial sustainability and analyzing the impact 
of increasing interest rates on the financial performance of MFIs in Andhra Pradesh. Beg 
(2016) used cross sectional unbalanced panel data from MIX Market for the period 2005 to 
2013 covering 10 MFIs with a total of 76 observations. FSS was the dependent variable 
while independent variables were real gross portfolio yield, average loan balance per 
borrower, portfolio at risk, personnel productivity ratio, capital cost to total assets ratio, 
gross loan portfolio to total assets ratio, and age of MFIs. Results from the pooled OLS 
model showed a significantly strong positive relationship between the yield on gross loan 
portfolio and FSS. Other significant determinants of financial self-sustainability were the 
portfolio at risk (30) days, and the size and age of an MFI. Beg (2016) concluded that MFIs 
need to charge optimum interest rates not only in order to cover operating costs but also to 




In another study, Nwachukwu (2014) analysed data from 2004 to 2008 for 426 MFIs from 
41 developing countries to study the role of interest rates and institutional design in assisting 
MFIs achieve financial self-sufficiency. The data examined was from MIX database for 
MFIs from Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern and Central Europe, South and 
East Asia, and Latin America. The strength of the affirmation that interest charges have a 
major role in determining the financial self-sufficiency of MFIs in developing countries was 
first explored. Secondly the validity of the hypothesis that “abusively high interest rates will 
undermine the profitability prospects of micro-lenders” was tested. Thirdly, the “statistical 
power of the supposition that the relationship between interest rates and financial self-
sufficiency varies with institutional design” was investigated. Estimation of the 
“unrestricted slope coefficients on the linear and quadratic interest rate variables” showed 
that MFIs would, on average, improve the possibility of attaining profitability up to 4.71% 
a year for every 1% increase in their portfolio yields. However, this was only up to the 76% 
annualized interest rate threshold above which a 1% rise in interest rates would lower 
chances of earning higher net returns by an annual average of 3.10%. 
 
Contrary to the above findings, Ek (2011) conducted a study on the key characteristics of 
financially sustainable MFIs and argued that the success of the studied MFIs was not high 
interest rates but ability to cut costs and ultimately charge less interest. After analyzing data 
for 1109 MFIs using MIX market data, results showed that the yields on gross portfolio for 
sustainable MFIs was lower than for non-sustainable MFIs implying that sustainable MFIs 
did not become self-sufficient by charging high interest rates. Similar results were obtained 
by Flosbach and Fellow (2013) who found that profitable MFIs tend to offer lower 
microloan interest rates after examining the relationship between the profitability of MFIs 
and the interest charged to their clients. Furthermore, Campion et. al. (2010) examined MFI 
interest rates and their determinants. The research used data for 35 MFIs located in Bolivia, 
the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Haiti, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Peru for the period 2005 
to 2008. The second data source was through telephone interviews with 12 MFI managers. 
The third data source was from client interviews in Haiti and Nicaragua. Regression 
analysis results showed trends of lower interest rates being charged by profit-making MFIs 
while interest rate ceilings reduced outreach to the poor, women, and rural clients.   
 
Other studies which particularly brought out the effects of interest rate ceilings on MFIs 




and Helms and Reille (2004). Maimbo and Gallegos (2014) undertook a “stock-taking 
exercise” to find out the number of countries with loan interest rate ceilings in force as well 
as the main characteristics of the regimes used by such countries. They used information 
from other research done on interest rate ceilings, the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor 
(CGAP) blogs, websites for various government agencies, and news sites which included 
the Financial Times and Reuters. 76 countries around the world were found to be using 
some form of loan interest rate caps. The effects of interest rate ceiling, which varied from 
country to country, included the withdrawal of financial services from the poor or from 
specific market segments, increased total cost of loans through additional fees and 
commissions, etc. The study by Alshebami and Khandare (2015) was aimed at reviewing 
the impact of interest rate ceilings on the microfinance industry by using secondary data 
from an assortment of sources such as microfinance books, websites, published papers and 
reports, etc. Alshebami and Khandare (2015) discovered that the introduction of interest 
rate ceilings inhibits the free interaction of supply and demand in the credit market. 
Specifically, they concluded that interest rate ceilings leads to the shortage of credit in the 
market, reduction in transparency regarding the actual cost of credit, limitation on the scope 
of operation for MFIs, and reduction in opportunities for the underprivileged to access 
loans. Helms and Reille (2004) examined the relationship between microfinance and 
interest rate ceilings using “current state of knowledge”, literature review, anecdotal 
evidence from experts, and survey of interest rate ceilings conducted by CGAP around the 
world. Helms and Reille (2004) contended that rather than protecting the vulnerable, 
interest rate ceilings often hurt them by reducing their access to financial services. In 
addition, interest rate ceilings makes the formal and semi-formal microlenders’ ability to 
cover costs difficult and sometimes impossible.  In extreme cases, these institutions are 
driven out of the market (or prevented from entering the market). As a result, access to 
financial services by poor clients is reduced causing them to resort to the services of 
expensive informal credit markets such as local moneylenders. They further argued that 
interest rate ceilings can also reduce transparency regarding the cost of credit as lenders 
may add “confusing” fees to their services. 
 
2.7 Literature Review Summary and Conclusion 
The literature review highlighted prior studies relating to interest rate ceiling and financial 
sustainability of MFIs. Prior studies involved MFIs from various countries but mostly from 




interest rate was the portfolio yield while the FSS and OSS were commonly used as proxies 
for financial sustainability. Methodologies varied but mainly involved regression analysis. 
Research objectives also varied but broad categories included determining factors affecting 
financial sustainability, determining the relationship between interest rates and financial 
sustainability, examining determinants of interest rates, and effects of interest rate ceilings.  
 
Findings depended on the research objectives, variables, and methodology. Generally, 
variables which significantly influenced financial sustainability included interest rates, 
interest rate spread, portfolio yield, and administrative costs. Effects of interest rate ceiling 
included reduced outreach, shortage of credit, increased cost of loans, reduced loan pricing 
transparency, and inability to cover costs. Some studies provided unexpected results which 
required further investigation. For instance, Marwa and Aziakpono (2015) found that 
administrative expenses did not affect OSS and FSS. Furthermore, Ek (2011) found that 
sustainable MFIs had comparatively lower portfolio yields, while Campion et. al. (2010) 
found lower interest rates being charged by for profit MFIs.  
 
The reviewed literature gives no indication of studies done on the subject of interest rate 
ceiling and financial sustainability exclusively of Zambian MFIs. This research will 
therefore fill this gap. Furthermore, unlike previous studies, this research will use quarterly 
aggregate time series data from the consolidated quarterly financial statements and use the 
Autoregressive Distributed Lags (ARDL) approach to determine the relationship between 
interest rate ceiling on financial sustainability of the microfinance sector as a whole instead 

















This chapter specifies and discusses the methodology employed in this research. The 
chapter begins with a discussion of the approach and strategy for this research and further 
gives a description of the variables used. The data, data analysis method, research model, 
research reliability, and research validity are also discussed. The chapter ends with an 
outline of the limitations for this research.  
3.1 Research Approach and Strategy 
This study analysed time series data extracted from quarterly consolidated financial 
statements for Zambian MFIs from March 2006 to September 2016. The study employed 
ARDL procedure to analyse 5 variables. The reason for using the ARDL model is because 
of its suitability for first order I(0) and second order I(1) small sample time series data 
(Gujarati, 2012). While using aggregate data does not reveal the OSS of individual MFIs, 
the research sought to determine whether there were any changes in the financial 
sustainability of the microfinance sector in general. One of the reasons for using this 
approach was based on the argument by Yaron and Manos (2010) that OSS cannot be used 
for purposes of comparing the self-sufficiency of individual MFIs, such that if MFI X has 
a larger OSS than MFI Y, it does not imply that MFI X is more self-sufficient than MFI Y.  
 
Some analysts consider FSS to be a more comprehensive measure of sustainability because 
it includes all costs apart from those associated with its own funds (De Crombrugghe et. al., 
2008). Ayayi and Sene (2010) also noted that FSS has become the key indicator for financial 
sustainability while Yaron and Manos (2010) noted that unlike OSS, FSS (as well as ROE 
and ROA) at least partly account for the subsidies received.  
 
Despite the above observations by De Crombrugghe et. al. (2008), Ayayi and Sene (2010), 
and Yaron and Manos (2010), the OSS was used as the measure of financial sustainability 





i. OSS is a measure of an MFI’s ability to survive while FSS indicates ability to grow 
(Barres et. al., 2005). The major interest of this study was to ascertain the ability of 
Zambian MFIs to survive following the introduction of the interest rate ceiling. 
ii. OSS reflects the ability of an MFI to continue operating if no further subsidies are 
received since it focuses on cost coverage (Barres et.al., 2005) and assists in 
comparing the sustainability for both institutionalist MFIs and welfarist MFIs 
“without discriminating between the usages of subsidies” (Nadiya et. al., 2012). 
iii. OSS is a simple and useful measure which can easily be calculated manually and 
used to monitor sustainability (Barres et. al., 2005). Conversely, FSS is a more 
advanced measure which requires computing concessional funds used and the 
associated opportunity costs for which data is not easy to obtain (Nadiya et. al., 
2012). De Crombrugghe et. al. (2008) also noted the difficulty of estimating an 
MFI’s own funds or equity and the associated opportunity costs and for this reason 
concluded that OSS is more likely to be reliable than FSS. 
iv. OSS is an indicator of the MFI’s profitability in a “traditional accounting sense” and 
indicates the MFI’s future performance, assuming that  there will be no change in 
the modes of operations, scope, and size, and provided that the MFI will continue 
receiving the same undisclosed amount of subsidies (Yaron & Manos, 2010). This 
research also adopted these assumptions. 
3.2 Description and Justification of Variables 
According to Islam et al. (2014), financial sustainability cannot be measured directly. “A 
priori idea of sustainability is believed to be reflected by proxies such as OSS and ROA”, 
hence the usage of OSS as a proxy for financial sustainability in this study. The independent 
variables used in this research are the Yield on Gross Portfolio (YGP), also called Portfolio 
Yield, Cost of Funds (CF), Operating Expenses (OE), and Loan Loss provision (LL).   
 
The Yield on Gross Portfolio ratio has been used in place of actual interest rates due to 
incomplete data for effective interest rates for the study period and also in line with the 
observation by Flosbach and Fellow (2013) that it is often used as an alternative to Effective 
Interest Rates (EIR). Gross Portfolio Yield is a “ratio of interest revenues to the average 
size of the loan portfolio” (Cull et. al., 2006) and is thus the “weighted average interest rate 
actually received by the MFI as a whole” (Gonzalez, 2010). The ratio measures how much 




(Barres et. al., 2005). The measure is intended to capture the “ex-ante interest rate” charged 
by the MFI instead of the “ex-post interest rate realized on the portfolio since loan losses 
are not netted out of the revenues (Cull et. al., 2006), and is thus an initial indicator of the 
ability to generate operations cash from the gross loan portfolio (Barres et. al., 2005).  
 
However, Gonzalez (2010) noted that there are many cases where the actual EIR charged 
by MFIs is underestimated by portfolio yield. Therefore, a low MFI portfolio yield does not 
necessarily imply a low EIR is charged to borrowers. For instance, MFIs can charge high 
EIRs, but if there is high loan delinquency both yield and interest income will be low 
(Gutie´rrez-Nieto et. al., 2016) due to an automatic reduction in the interest yield (i.e. the 
actual cash which has been received by the MFI) compared to the contract rate (i.e., the 
cash which should have been paid by the borrower) (Gonzalez, 2010). Furthermore, 
portfolio yield is sensitive to the sequence of loan payments such as “principal first and 
interest last” schedules as well as to “loans with grace periods or re-scheduling” due to 
delayed payments. Also, the requirement for borrowers to deposit a certain percentage of 
their loan with the MFI (compulsory savings) increases the difference between EIR and 
portfolio yield (Gutie´rrez-Nieto et. al., 2016). 
 
Flosbach and Fellow (2013) noted that despite having some shortfalls, portfolio yield is 
often used as an alternative to EIR because of the ease with which it is calculated using 
financial statements. Furthermore, the portfolio yield indicator is not distorted by unrealistic 
accrual or deferral policies, refinancing, or non-cash payments that can conceal problems 
relating to loan delinquency (Barres et. al, 2005).  
 
Robinson (1996) cited by Islam et al., (2014) argued that microfinance interest rates should 
cover all operating costs for the MFI while Ayayi and Sene (2010) showed that integration 
of quality management and good expense control is vital for financial sustainability. Based 
on these arguments and other previous studies, Islam et al., (2014) proposed that 
microfinance sustainability is influenced by operating expenses, and also hypothesized a 
significant negative relationship between cost of funds and OSS. Hence the inclusion of 
operating expenses and cost of funds as independent variables in this study. 
 
The inclusion of loan loss provision as one of the independent variables is based on the 




the direct costs including loan loss provisions (Ledgerwood, 1999). Kanake (2014) 
conducted a research on the effect of credit risk management indicators on financial 
sustainability of Kenyan MFls using data for 37 MFls. The research used FSS as the 
dependent variable and loan loss provision, risk cover ratio, and portfolio at risk as 
independent variables. Portfolio at risk and loan loss provision were both found to have a 
significant negative effect on financial sustainability.  
 
The five 5 variables used in this research are described in table 3.1 below. Descriptions for 
Cost of Funds, Operating Expenses, and Loan Loss Provision are adopted from CGAP 
(2003) while the description for Operational Self-Sufficiency and Yield on Gross Portfolio 
are adopted from Barres et.al (2005). 
 
Table 3.1: Description of variables  
     
A.    Dependent Variable 




Financial Revenue/(Financial Expenses + Loan Loss Provision Expenses 
+ Operating Expenses) 
B.    Independent Variables 




Yield on Gross 
Portfolio (YGP) 
Cash Received from Interest, Fees, 
and Commissions on Loan 
Portfolio/Average Gross Loan 
Portfolio 
Positive Cull et. al. (2006) 
3 Cost of Funds (CF)  
All interest, fees, and commissions 
incurred on all liabilities including 
client deposit accounts, and all 
borrowings and credit line facility 
fees 




All personnel and administrative 
expenses incurred while providing 
financial services 
Negative Islam et al. (2014) 
5 
Loan Loss 
Provision (LL)  
A non-cash expense calculated as a 
percentage of the gross loan 
portfolio at risk of default. 
 




3.3 Data Collection, Choice, and Frequency 
Most previous studies on financial sustainability of MFIs used data from the Microfinance 
Information Exchange organization (Mix Market). Mix Market collects data from various 
MFIs around the world which it uses to compute various MFI-specific indicators. The data 
is made available via the website www.mixmarket.org.  While the Mix Market is considered 
by many researchers to provide the most accurate microfinance data, MFIs have no 
reporting obligation to the organisation. Therefore a natural sample selection bias is 
involved when using such data (Dorfleitner, et al., 2013). For instance their website only 
included twelve (12) out of thirty four (34) Zambian MFIs in the country’s data for 31 
December 2014. For this reason, this study used secondary quantitative time series data 
extracted from consolidated quarterly microfinance financial statements prepared by the 
BOZ. A time series data set is made up of observations on one or more variables over time 
and therefore the data is arranged chronologically with a particular time frequency such as 
hourly, daily, monthly, quarterly, annual, biannual etc. (Gujarati & Porter, 2009). The time 
series data that was extracted from the quarterly financial statements (income statements 
and balance sheets) included the financial revenue, operating expenses, cost of funds, loan 
loss provisions, interest income, interest expense, non-interest income, fee and commission 
income, as well as gross loans and advances.  
3.4 Sampling 
Aggregated quarterly time series financial data comprising 43 observations and covering 
34 MFIs for the period March 2006 to September 2016 was used. The study included all 
MFIs that were registered by the central bank of Zambia during this period. 
3.5 Model Specification and Data Analysis Methods 
Time series analysis was performed by using the following Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression model; 
 
𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑌𝐺𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐹𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑂𝐸𝑡 + 𝑡                                   3.1      
    
Where t denotes period. OSS, YGP, LL, CF, OE and LL are as defined in Table 3.1. α and 




Quantitative analysis of the data was done using the EViews 9.5 Statistical Package 
software (student version). Microsoft excel 2013 was also used to make some of the 
calculations as well as graphs and tables.  
 
3.6 Model Diagnostics 
Considering that this study used time series data, the properties of the data were examined 
in order to ascertain its stationarity and thus determine the appropriate data analysis method 
and ensure valid regression results. In addition, since ARDL is a linear regression model, 
the underlying assumptions under the classical linear regression model (CLRM), and the 
model’s goodness of fit were also verified through various diagnostic and stability tests. 
The verified assumptions included linearity (using Ramsey RESET test), normality (using 
Jarque-Bera test), homoscedasticity (using the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test), serial 
correlation (using the Breusch-Godfrey LM test), and stability (using cumulative sum of 
recursive residuals i.e. CUSUM test). 
 
3.6.1 Stationarity of Time Series  
Empirical studies involving time series data assumes that the underlying time series are 
stationary. A time series is stationary “if its mean and variance are constant over time and 
the value of the covariance between the two time periods depends only on the distance or 
gap or lag between the two time periods and not the actual time at which the covariance is 
computed”. Conversely, a nonstationary time series is characterized by a “time varying 
mean, or a time varying variance, or both”. However, despite the assumption of stationarity, 
nonstationary time series are sometimes encountered resulting in autocorrelation (“the 
correlation between a variable lagged one or more periods and itself”) (Gujarati & Porter, 
2009), hence the need for stationarity tests.  
 
The other reason for ensuring stationarity of data is because the behavior of nonstationary 
time series can only be studied for the time period being considered and cannot be 
generalized to other time periods thereby rendering such studies less relevant for policy 
analysis or forecasting. Furthermore, a very high R2 is sometimes obtained when a time 
series variable is regressed on another time series variable(s) even if there isn’t a meaningful 
relationship between the regressed variables thereby giving “spurious or nonsense 




from nonstationary to stationary series (Gujarati & Porter, 2009). Stationarity can be tested 
in various ways such as graphical analysis, correlogram test, and unit root test.  
 
3.6.1.1 The Unit Root Test 
According to Gujarati and Porter (2009), the unit root test is one of the most widely used 
test of stationarity and it starts with the unit root (stochastic) process as follows; 
 
 𝑌𝑡 =  𝜌 𝑌𝑡−1 +  𝑢𝑡           − 1 ≤  𝜌 ≤  1                      3.2 
 
where ut is a white noise error term. 
 
If ρ = 1 (in the case of the unit root), equation 3.2 becomes a random walk model without 
drift, which is a nonstationary time series. Therefore, Yt can be regressed on its (one-period) 
lagged value Yt−1 in order to determine whether the estimated ρ is statistically equal to 1. If 
the estimated ρ is statistically equal to 1, then Yt is nonstationary. Equation 3.2 cannot 
however, be estimated by OLS and the hypothesis that ρ = 1 cannot be tested by the usual t 
test because such a test is highly biased in the case of a unit root. As such, Yt−1 is subtracted 
from both sides of equation 3.2 to obtain: 
  
 𝑌𝑡 −  𝑌𝑡−1 =  𝜌 𝑌𝑡−1 −  𝑌𝑡−1 +  𝑢𝑡 
  = (𝜌 − 1) 𝑌𝑡−1 +  𝑢𝑡         3.3 
 
which can also be written as: 
 
 ∆ 𝑌𝑡 =  𝛿 𝑌𝑡−1 +  𝑢𝑡         3.4 
 
where δ = (ρ − 1) and Δ is the first difference operator 
 
Equation 3.4 is normally estimated in practice and the null and alternative hypotheses that 
δ = 0 and δ < 0 respectively are tested (since δ = (ρ − 1)), ρ should be less than 1 for 
stationarity. Thus, δ must be negative for this to happen). If δ = 0, then ρ = 1, in which case 
a unit root exists and therefore the time series is nonstationary. Equation 3.4 becomes; 





where ΔYt is the first difference of Yt, and ut is a white noise error term and therefore 
stationary, implying stationarity of the first differences of a random walk time series. 
 
The above is called first-order differencing. Differencing is applied in order to entirely 
remove the trend component from a series (i.e. to make it stationary) by computing absolute 
changes from period to period. The differenced series is differenced one or more times if it 
still exhibits a trend after first-order differencing (Gujarati & Porter, 2009). 
 
3.6.1.2 The Dickey-Fuller Test 
The first differences of Yt  are regressed on Yt−1 in equation 3.4 to check if the regression’s 
estimated slope coefficient (=𝛿) is zero or not. If the estimated slope coefficient is zero, the 
conclusion is that Yt is nonstationary while if it is negative the conclusion is that Yt is 
stationary. Since the t value of the estimated coefficient of Yt−1 does not follow the t 
distribution under the null hypothesis that δ = 0 (i.e. ρ = 1), that is, it doesn’t have an 
“asymptotic normal distribution”, the t test cannot be used to check if the estimated 
coefficient of Yt−1 in equation 3.4 is zero or not. The alternative is the Dickey-Fuller (DF) 
test. The key insight of the DF test is that testing for nonstationarity is equivalent to testing 
for the existence of a unit root (Gujarati & Porter, 2009). 
 
Under the null hypothesis that δ = 0, the estimated t value of the coefficient of Yt−1 in 
equation 3.4 follows the τ (tau) statistic. Thus the tau statistic or test is also referred to as 
the DF test. If the hypothesis that δ = 0 is rejected, the series is stationary. The alternative 
hypothesis is that δ < 0 (or ρ < 1) and therefore the test is one-sided (Gujarati, 2009). 
 
Considering that a random walk process may or may not have drift, or it may have both 
stochastic trends and deterministic trends, the DF test is estimated under three different null 
hypotheses in order to take into account the various possibilities (Gujarati & Porter, 2009). 
 
Yt is a random walk:    ∆ 𝑌𝑡 =  𝛿 𝑌𝑡−1 +  𝑢𝑡    3.4 
Yt is a random walk with drift:   ∆ 𝑌𝑡 =  𝛽1 + 𝛿 𝑌𝑡−1 +  𝑢𝑡   3.6 
 
Yt is a random walk with drift  





where t is the time or trend variable. The hypotheses in each of the above cases are: 
 
H0 :  δ = 0 (presence of a unit root or nonstationary time series, or stochastic trend) 
H1 :  δ < 0 (Stationary time series, possibly around a deterministic trend) 
 
Rejecting the null hypothesis (H0) means either Yt is stationary with zero mean (for equation 
3.4), or Yt is stationary with nonzero mean (for equation 3.6). For equation 3.7, a test for δ 
< 0 (no stochastic trend) and α ≠ 0 (presence of deterministic trend) can be simultaneously 
conducted with the F test, but using the DF table of critical values. A time series may have 
a combination of both a deterministic and a stochastic trend (Gujarati & Porter, 2009). 
 
The estimation procedure is done by estimating equation 3.4, or equation 3.5, or equation 
3.6 by OLS and then computing the (τ) tau statistic for each case, dividing the estimated 
coefficient of Yt−1 by its standard error. Reference is then made to the DF tables (or statistical 
package) for critical values. The hypothesis that δ = 0 is rejected if the absolute value of the 
computed tau statistic (|τ |) is larger than the absolute DF or MacKinnon critical tau values, 
and thus the time series is stationary. If, however, the computed |τ | is smaller than the 
absolute critical tau value, the null hypothesis is not rejected, and thus the time series is 
nonstationary (Gujarati & Porter, 2009).  
 
3.6.1.3 The Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
The assumption in conducting the DF test in equation 3.4, 3.6, and 3.7, is that the error term 
ut is uncorrelated. If however, the ut are correlated the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test 
is used. The ADF “augments” the three preceding equations by adding extra lagged values 
of the dependent variable ΔYt  in order to remove autocorrelation. The ADF also tests 
whether δ = 0 and the test follows the same asymptotic distribution as the DF statistic. 
Therefore the same critical values as in DF can be used (Gujarati & Porter, 2009). 
 
3.6.1.4 The Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test 
The DF tests are supported by the distribution theory that is based on the assumption that 
the “error terms are statistically independent and have a constant variance”. Therefore the 
error terms must be uncorrelated and their variance constant when using the ADF 
methodology. The Phillips-Perron (PP) test is essentially a generalized ADF test procedure 




(Asteriou & Hall, 2007). While the ADF test makes adjustments to the DF test to take into 
consideration any possible serial correlation among error terms by adding lagged difference 
terms of the dependent variable, the PP test does not but uses nonparametric statistical 
methods to take care of the serial correlation in the error terms. The ADF test statistic and 
the asymptotic distribution of the PP test are the same (Gujarati & Porter, 2009). 
 
The following is the PP test regression; 
 
∆ 𝑌𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝑌𝑡−1 +  𝑒𝑡         3.8 
 
With the foregoing, the ADF tests were conducted to determine whether the variables in 
this study were stationary at levels, at 1st difference, or a mixture of both, and to also ensure 
that none of the variables was integrated of order 2 [I(2)] in which case it would be 
inappropriate to use the ARDL model. Employing the ARDL model in data analysis 
requires the time series data to be stationary purely at level I(0), or purely at first difference 
I(1), or mixture of level and first difference. The ADF test results were further verified by 
the PP test.  
 
3.6.2 Cointegration 
Time series variables are said to be cointegrated when some of their linear combinations 
are stationary (Gujarati & Porter, 2009) i.e. they have a “long-term, or equilibrium 
relationship” among them (Asteriou & Hall, 2007). Cointegration is an overriding 
requirement for models that use nonstationary time series data because lack of cointegration 
among variables normally results into a spurious regression (Asteriou & Hall, 2007).  
 
Cointegrated variables are characterized by a mean reverting spread that causes the 
variables to move around the “common stochastic trends”. For two nonstationary variables, 
the error can be represented as a combination of two cumulated error processes (stochastic 
trends). It is expected that these cumulated error processes would combine to produce 
another nonstationary process. However, were two variables, say Yt and Xt are actually 
related, it is expected that they would move together and the two stochastic trends would 
be very similar such that it will be possible to find their combination which eliminates 
nonstationarity (stochastic trends cancel out). Variables in this special case are said to be 




common trend linking them together even though the variables will rise overtime (since 
they are trended). For a long-run relationship (equilibrium) to exist, a linear combination of 
Yt and Xt (i.e. a stationary variable) is required (Gujarati & Porter, 2009).  
 
The Yt and Xt linear combination is drawn from the following (Gujarati & Porter, 2009): 
 
 𝑌𝑡 =  𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑡 +  𝑢𝑡            3.9 
 
taking the residuals gives: 
 
û𝑡 =   𝑌𝑡 − ?̂?1 − ?̂?2𝑋𝑡            3.10 
 
The variables Yt and Xt are cointegrated if ût  ~ I(0).  
 
In this study, the short and long run relationship of the dependent variable (OSS) on the 
independent variables, was estimated through the bounds test. The bounds test is based on 
the F-Test which relies on the hypothesis that:  
H0: = β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = β5 = 0 
There is no cointegration among the variables  
 
H0: ≠ β1 ≠ β2 ≠ β3 ≠ β4 ≠ β5 ≠ 0 
There is cointegration among the variables  
 
3.6.3 Misspecification and Normality Tests 
In reality, it is difficult to be certain about the specification or form of the equation to be 
estimated. For instance it is common to have specification errors by estimating an equation 
which omits one or more significant independent variables or an equation that includes 
independent variables that do not belong to the “true” specification. Other functional form 
misspecification issues can arise when the assumption that the relationship among the Y and 
Xs is linear, is no longer true (Asteriou & Hall, 2007).  
 
General misspecification is mostly tested using the Regressions Specification Error Test 
(RESET). If F-statistic is greater than the F-critical value, the null hypothesis of correct 




Alternatively, if the F-statistic p-value is smaller than the required significance level (e.g. 
0.05), then the null Ramsey's RESET test is rejected.  
 
Observing the regression residuals is another way of detecting misspecification problems. 
Additionally, one of the CLRM assumptions is the normal distribution of residuals with a 
constant variance and a zero mean. When this assumption is violated, the regression model’s 
inferential statistics are invalidated. Therefore, tests for normality of residuals are quite 
critical (Asteriou & Hall, 2007). Normality test in this study was done by computing and 
interpreting the Jargue-Berra (JB) statistic.  
 
3.6.4 Heteroscedasticity 
One of the important CLRM assumptions is the homoscedasticity of disturbance terms ui in 
the population regression function (that is, they have an equal variance). Failure to satisfy 
this assumption leads to the problem of heteroscedasticity, or unequal variance (Gujarati & 
Porter, 2009). There are various reasons for heteroscedasticity which may include; the 
presence of outliers in the data, incorrect regression model functional form, incorrect data 
transformation, mixing observations with different measures of scale, etc. (Gujarati, 2012). 
 
Consequences of heteroscedasticity include (Gujarati, 2012); 
i. Failure to alter the “unbiasedness and consistency properties” of OLS estimators 
ii. OLS estimators are not best linear unbiased estimators (BLUE), that is, they are no 
longer of minimum variance or efficient but simply linear unbiased estimators (LUE) 
iii. Consequently, the t and F tests under the CLRM standard assumptions may be 
unreliable, which may further lead to inaccurate conclusions about the statistical 
significance of the regression coefficients. 
In view of the heteroscedasticity consequences, heteroscedasticity tests were conducted. 
 
3.7 Research Reliability and Validity  
All the data for this research was obtained from the BOZ which is the country’s central 
bank. The BOZ has the regulatory authority over all registered MFIs in Zambia and receives 
periodic financial returns from them partly for purposes of monitoring their performance. 





3.8 Limitations  
The following limitations were noted for this study; 
 The composition of the microfinance sector kept changing as new MFIs were being 
opened while some closed during the period under study 
 The research did not distinguish between subsidized and unsubsidized MFIs 
 The research did not distinguish between deposit taking and non-deposit taking MFIs 
 The research is limited to the Zambian microfinance sector 
 
3.9 Research Methodology Summary  
This chapter specified and discussed the methodology employed in this research. The study 
used quarterly financial statements for the Zambian microfinance sector from March 2006 
to September 2016 obtained from the central bank to extract quarterly secondary data for 
four (4) independent variables namely, Portfolio Yield, Cost of Funds, Operating Expenses, 
and Loan Loss provision. OSS was the dependent variable. The quarterly secondary 
aggregate data covered 34 MFIs and yielded 43 observations. ARDL was employed for the 
time series analysis using the Eviews 9.5 statistical package software (student version). 
Various diagnostic tests such as tests for normality, homoscedasticity, serial correlation, 


















RESEARCH FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings of this study and provides their analysis. The chapter 
presents and discusses the descriptive statistics as well as the model diagnostics. The time 
series analysis of stationarity, cointegration, and the long and short run estimates of the 
determinants of operational self-sufficiency are also discussed in this chapter.  
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
From the descriptive statistics table 4.1, the mean OSS was 1.37 (137%) signifying that the 
MFIs were on average sustainable since this is well above 100%, although the lowest OSS 
indicator of 0.93 (93%) signified that the MFIs were not sustainable during the respective 
quarter. The relatively small standard deviation implies that the OSS of the individual MFIs 
were generally close to the mean OSS value.  
 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for Individual Variables 
 OSS YGP LL OE CF 
 Mean  1.374044  0.147277  9199.925  58960.52  38957.68 
 Median  1.305167  0.155405  7323.000  48472.01  13592.16 
 Maximum  1.993670  0.283913  32568.27  156146.1  165916.4 
 Minimum  0.927897  0.058252 -157.3000  10758.00  4226.000 
 Std. Dev.  0.271137  0.057108  8381.318  38963.69  47554.08 
 Skewness  0.490485  0.396018  1.392490  0.642994  1.575124 
 Kurtosis  2.306628  2.523682  4.225968  2.360107  4.247325 
 Jarque-Bera  2.585494  1.530442  16.58925  3.696618  20.56812 
 Probability  0.274516  0.465231  0.000250  0.157503  0.000034 
 Sum  59.08390  6.332921  395596.8  2535302.  1675180. 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  3.087642  0.136974  2.95E+09  6.38E+10  9.50E+10 
 Observations  43  43  43  43  43 
Note: OSS=operational self-sufficiency; YGP= Yield on Gross Portfolio; LL= Loan Loss Provision; OE= 
Operating Expenses CF= Cost of Funds.  
 
 
Source: EViews 9.5 output 
 
The mean YGP shows that MFIs were able to generate operations cash from their gross 
loan portfolios at an average rate of 14.73%, almost half the maximum rate of 28.39%. The 





An average amount of K9,199.93 was being provided for loan losses by the MFIs, with the 
highest provision during the study period being K32,568.27. The mean for LL, OE and CF 
were K9,199.93, K58,960.52 and K38,957.68 respectively with all the 3 variables having 
very large differences between their highest and lowest values signifying a large range for 
each of them. This shows substantial changes in loan repayments, operating costs, and cost 
of funds during the study period. This is also in line with their high standard deviation 
values which signified substantial variations from the mean values. As such their mean 
values cannot be generalised to the individual MFIs. Their medians were also markedly 
different from their mean values unlike OSS and YGP. 
 
4.2 Trend Analysis 
4.2.1 Yield on Gross Portfolio Trend 
Yield on Gross Portfolio (or Portfolio Yield) was the interest rate proxy in this study. The 
Yield on Gross Portfolio is an indication of the “ex-ante interest rate” charged by MFIs 
(Cull et. al., 2006). Quarterly portfolio yield averaged 14.73% with a standard deviation of 
5.7% as shown in table 4.1 for descriptive statistics. The trend of computed quarterly 
portfolio yield between March 2006 and September 2016 is shown in figure 4.1 below.   
 




Source: Author’s computations using Bank of Zambia Data 
 
The graph shows a minimum portfolio yield of 5.83% in June 2013 and the maximum of 
28.39% in December 2007. The trend of the Yield on Gross Portfolio showed a significant 
decline during the period when the interest rate ceiling was introduced (January 2013 to 
November 2015). The yield gradually rose after the ceiling was removed at the end of 2015 




















































































































































































































Though the portfolio yields appear low, taking into account the fact that the central bank 
imposed a cap on the MFI interest rates due to high interest rates, they do not necessarily 
imply MFIs were charging their clients low EIRs during the study period since there are 
many situations where the actual effective interest charged by MFIs is underestimated by 
portfolio yield such as loan delinquency, the sequence of loan payments, rescheduled loans 
or loans with grace periods, and compulsory savings (Gonzalez, 2010; Dorfleitner et.al., 
2013; Gutie´rrez-Nieto et. al., 2016). Similarly, Waterfield (2001) noted that contrary to the 
earlier position adopted by the microfinance industry that the MFI’s average portfolio yield 
was the one particular ratio which was an adequate representation of loan prices, aggregate 
portfolio yield does not provide detailed answers to pricing. 
 
4.2.2 Operational Self Sufficiency Trend 
Table I in the appendix provides the data used to calculate the consolidated OSS of the MFI 
sector in Zambia from March 2006 to September 2016. 
 
From the descriptive statistics in table 4.1 above, the average OSS during the study was 
137.40%. Figure 4.2 below gives a graphical representation of the OSS between March 
2006 and September 2016.  
 
Figure 4.2: MFI Sector OSS Quarterly Trend 
 
 



























































































































































































































4.2.2.1 Operational Self Sufficiency before Interest Rate Ceiling 
The period before the interest rate ceiling is March 2006 to December 2012. The OSS trend 
showed that MFIs generated more than sufficient revenue to cover their operating expenses 
and therefore sustainable during this period despite the downward trend. 
 
4.2.2.2 Operational Self Sufficiency during Interest Rate Ceiling 
The period when interest rate ceiling was in force was January 2013 to November 2015. 
This period had very low levels of OSS compared to the period before the ceiling. The 
decline in trend was generally steeper until the OSS was below the break-even point of 1.00 
during the first quarter of 2014 signifying that the MFIs were generally unsustainable 
around this time. OSS slightly rose from June 2014 but declined again in September 2015. 
 
4.2.2.3 Operational Self Sufficiency after Removal of Interest Rate Ceiling 
Interest rate ceiling was removed in November 2015. Despite the indication that the sector 
was sustainable during this period with OSS well above the breakeven point, it was still 
lower than the period before introducing the ceiling. 
4.3 Correlation Analysis 
Table 4.2 below shows the correlations among the variables used in this study. It can be 
seen that the variables were generally highly correlated, particularly OE and YGP, OE and 
CF, and LL and CF. Therefore, there is a fair amount of shared variance that is statistically 
removed in the model for this study due to the inclusion of these highly-correlated variables. 
 
Table 4.2: Correlation of Variables 
 
 OSS YGP LL OE CF 
OSS  1.000000  0.661217 -0.439296 -0.615364 -0.496566 
YGP  0.661217  1.000000 -0.489056 -0.759952 -0.622303 
LL -0.439296 -0.489056  1.000000  0.698570  0.736773 
OE -0.615364 -0.759952  0.698570  1.000000  0.909079 
CF -0.496566 -0.622303  0.736773  0.909079  1.000000 
Note: OSS=operational self-sufficiency; YGP= Yield on Gross Portfolio; LL= Loan Loss Provision; OE= 
Operating Expenses CF= Cost of Funds.  
 
 
Source: EViews 9.5 output 
 
One of the CLRM assumptions is the nonexistence of exact linear relationship among 




(Gujarati, 2012). According to Gujarati and Porter (2009), multicollinearity may arise due 
to the method of data collection, model constraints, population sample constrains, or model 
specification. In the case of time series data, multicollinearity could be due to including 
regressors with a common trend, i.e. they all increase or decrease over time.  
 
Despite some multicollinearity concerns, Gujarati and Porter (2009) noted that it does not 
violate any regression assumption since unbiased, consistent estimates will still be there and 
their standard errors may be correctly estimated. However, OLS estimators may have large 
variances and covariances despite being BLUE thereby making it difficult to make precise 
estimation. The t ratio of one or more coefficients may also be statistically insignificant. In 
addition, OLS estimators and standard errors may be sensitive to small changes in data. 
 
One of the options to deal with multicollinearity is to remove one of the collinear variables 
from the model. However, this may result into a specification bias or error. Also, simple or 
bivariate correlation coefficients do not hold the other variables constant when calculating 
the pairwise correlations. Furthermore, if CLRM assumptions are satisfied, OLS estimators 
of the regression estimators are BLUE (or BUE, if normality assumption is added) even if 
multicollinearity is very high. Moreover, collinearity is often a data deficiency problem, 
and there may not be alternatives regarding the choice of data. Furthermore, even if one or 
more regression coefficients cannot be precisely estimated, a linear combination of them 
can still be efficiently estimated (Gujarati & Porter, 2009). Therefore, Gujarati (2012) 
advised that if the model consists of several variables that legitimately belong to the model, 
they shouldn’t be removed.  
 
Gujarati and Porter (2009) noted that multicollinearity is often reduced by the first 
difference regression model. This is because there is no a priori reason to believe that the 
differences of variables will be highly correlated even if they are highly correlated at level.  
 
Based on the above discussions by Gujarati (2012) and Gujarati and Porter (2009) as well 
as several diagnostic tests which supported the model, the high correlations among some of 





4.4 Unit Root Test Results 
Results of the ADF and PP unit root tests (with trend and intercept) are presented in table 
4.3 below. Both the ADF and PP test results above shows that three variables namely OSS, 
YGP, and LL were stationary at level, i.e. integrated of order I(0), since their ADF and PP 
test statistics absolute values were greater than corresponding absolute test critical values 
and their respective p-values were less than 5% (significant at 5% level). Therefore, the null 
hypothesis of unit root was rejected at level. On the other hand, two variables namely OE 
and CF were stationary at first difference and thus integrated of order I (1) 
 
Table 4.3: ADF and PP Unit Root Test Results 
 
 ADF TEST  PP TEST 
Variable Lag  ADF  TCV (5%) Decision    Bandwidth PP TCV (5%) Decision  
    OSS 0 -4.097** -3.521 Stationary   1 -4.027** -3.521 Stationary 
    YGP 0 -5.120*** -3.521 Stationary   6 -5.131*** -3.521 Stationary 
    OE 0 -0.047 -3.530 Non-stationary   3 -4.142** -3.521 Non-stationary 
    LL 0 -4.448*** -3.521 Stationary   4 -4.354*** -3.521 Stationary 
    CF 0 0.743 -3.521 Non-stationary   7  1.215317 -3.521 Non-stationary 
 
First Difference  
 
First Difference 
    OE 2 -8.433*** -3.530 Stationary   14 -27.183 -3.524 Stationary 
    CF 0 -3.524*** -7.145 Stationary   0 -7.145 -3.524 Stationary 
Note: OSS=operational self-sufficiency; YGP= Yield on Gross Portfolio; LL= Loan Loss Provision; OE= Operating Expense; CF= Cost of Funds. ADF= 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Statistic; PP=Phillip-Perron test statistic TCV = Test Critical Value. Lag length chosen was automatic - based on 
Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC); Bandwidth chosen was automatic based on Newey-West using the default (Bartlett kernel) spectral 
estimation method.  
 
Source: Authors compilation using Eviews 9.5 output 
 
4.5 ARDL Model Estimation 
Following the unit root tests which revealed the data as comprising a combination of series 
integrated of order zero and of order one, the ARDL (3, 3, 4, 3, 4) model was estimated, 
with the maximum lags of 4 automatically selected by EViews based on the Akaike 
Information Criteria (AIC). Diagnostic tests were then conducted to check the model’s 
credibility. The ARDL model is presented in table III of the appendix. 
 
4.6 Coefficient Diagnostics Results 
4.6.1 ARDL Bounds Test for Cointegration Results 
The ARDL-Bounds test was applied to check the cointegration of variables in the model. 




bound. All the variables are assumed to be I(0) under the lower critical bound meaning that 
there is no cointegration among the variables. On the other hand, all the variables are 
assumed to be I(1) under the upper bound meaning that the variables are cointegrated. The 
computed F-statistic value which is greater than the upper bound critical value implies that 
H0 must be rejected (variables are cointegrated). On the other hand, H0 should not be 
rejected if the computed F-statistic is lower than the lower bound critical value (variables 
are not cointegrated). The cointegration test results are said to be inconclusive if the 
computed F-statistic falls between the lower and upper bound values.  
 
Table 4.4: ARDL Bounds Test Results 
 
Test Statistic Value k 
F-statistic  5.101324 4 
Critical Value Bounds 
Significance I (0) Bound I (1) Bound 
10% 2.2 3.09 
5% 2.56 3.49 
2.5% 2.88 3.87 
1% 3.29 4.37 
Note: K=number independent variables. I (0) and I (1) are lower and upper bounds respectively.   
 
Source: Eviews 9.5 output 
 
 
From the ARDL bounds test results above, the null hypothesis that no long-run relationships 
exist was rejected since the computed F-statistic value of 5.101324 is greater than the 
critical upper bounds value (I1) of 3.49 at 5% significance level. This signified the presence 
of cointegration, that is, the existence of a long run (equilibrium) relationship between OSS 
and the independent variables. Thus, the model is free from autocorrelation. 
 
4.6.2 Short and Long Run Estimates of OSS 
Results of short run determinants of OSS are presented in table 4.5. The cointegrating 
equation or Error Correction Model (ECM) denoted by “CointEq (-1)” in table 4.5 has a 
negative coefficient of -1.243 and a significant p-value of 0.0000 at 5% level. The 
statistically significant and high magnitude negative ECM coefficient confirms the 
existence of both short run and long run relationships among the variables. The ECM 
coefficient implies that the previous period disequilibrium is corrected at a speed of 





Table 4.5: Short Run Estimates of OSS 
 
Dependent Variable: OSS 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
D (OSS(-1)) 0.382 0.174 2.198** 0.043 
D (OSS(-2)) 0.147 0.107 1.375 0.1881 
D (YGP) 1.120 0.656 1.708 0.1069 
D (YGP(-1)) -4.084 0.784 -5.210*** 0.0001 
D (YGP(-2)) -3.245 0.588 -5.518*** 0.0000 
D (LL) 0.000 0.000 -1.030 0.3183 
D (LL(-1)) 0.000 0.000 -0.924 0.3692 
D (LL(-2)) 0.000 0.000 -0.801 0.4347 
D (LL(-3)) 0.000 0.000 1.846* 0.0834 
D (DOE) 0.000 0.000 -0.869 0.3978 
D (DOE(-1)) 0.000 0.000 2.859** 0.0114 
D (DOE(-2)) 0.000 0.000 2.981*** 0.0088 
D (DCF) 0.000 0.000 1.703 0.1079 
D (DCF(-1)) 0.000 0.000 -4.472*** 0.0004 
D (DCF(-2)) 0.000 0.000 -3.528*** 0.0028 
D (DCF(-3)) 0.000 0.000 -2.376** 0.0303 
CointEq (-1) -1.243 0.196 -6.338*** 0.0000 
Note: OSS=operational self-sufficiency; YGP= Yield on Gross Portfolio; LL= Loan Loss Provision; OE= Operating 
Expenses CF= Cost of Funds. CointEq (-1) = Error correction vector; *** and ** denotes significance at 1% and 5% 
respectively.  
 
Source: EViews 9.5 Output 
 
Yield on Gross Portfolio, Operating Expenses, and Cost of Funds were found to influence 
OSS significantly in the short-run. Yield on Gross Portfolio and Cost of Funds had a 
negative significant relationship while Operating Expenses had a positive and significant 
relationship. Results for long run determinants of OSS are presented in table 4.6 below. 
 
      Table 4.6: Long Run Estimates of OSS 
 
Dependent Variable: OSS 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
C 0.485 0.130 3.744*** 0.0018 
YGP 5.980 0.576 10.384*** 0.0000 
LL 0.000 0.000 -0.187 0.8537 
DOE 0.000 0.000 -0.950 0.3563 
DCF 0.000 0.000 2.360** 0.0313 
Note: OSS=operational self-sufficiency; YGP= Yield on Gross Portfolio; LL= Loan Loss Provision; OE= Operating 
Expenses CF= Cost of Funds. *** and ** denotes significance at 1% and 5% respectively.  
 





In the long run relationship, Yield on Gross Portfolio (YGP) and Cost of Funds (CF) were 
positively and significantly related to Operational Self-sufficiency. From the magnitude of 
the YGP coefficient in table 4.6, a one percent increase in the Yield on Gross Portfolio 
would lead to an average increase of 5.98% in the Operational Self-sufficiency ratio since 
the relationship between the variables is positive and statistically significant. The rationale 
for this relationship can be explained in terms of the definition of both OSS and Gross 
Portfolio Yield. Gross Portfolio Yield is the “weighted average interest rate actually 
received by the MFI” (Gonzalez, 2010) while OSS indicates whether or not sufficient 
revenue has been generated to cover operational costs (Ledgerwood, 1999) and to provide 
a margin for financing growth (Ayayi & Sene, 2010). Considering that that interest paid by 
clients is the main revenue for MFIs (De Ridder, 2010), a rise in Yield on Gross Portfolio 
entails a rise in interest income and hence sustainability.  In Zambia, trend analysis for the 
study period showed that as the Yield on Gross Portfolio increased, OSS also increased. 
The introduction of interest rate caps led to a noticeable decline in OSS and the gradual rise 
was also noticed after the removal of the cap. Therefore, it can be concluded that the 
reduction in interest income (as represented by the Yield on Gross Portfolio) due to interest 
rate ceilings led to a reduction in OSS and vice versa. 
 
These results are consistent with expectation and empirical findings from literature such as 
Cull et. al., 2006 who found a positive and significant relationship between Gross Portfolio 
Yield and sustainability. De Crombrugghe et. al. (2008) also found that the Portfolio Yield 
positively affected financial self-sufficiency through interest and fees revenue. 
Furthermore, after comparing mean portfolio yields from their study, Campion et. al. (2010) 
found that financially self-sufficient MFIs usually charge higher interest rates than MFIs 
that are not financially self-sufficient. Therefore, the higher the Yield on Gross Portfolio, 
the higher the OSS.  Other studies in which the Yield on Gross Portfolio was fpiund to be 
positively related to OSS include Marwa and Aziakpono (2015, Iezza (2010), Woldeyes 
(2012), etc. 
 
The long run relationship between Cost of Funds and OSS showed that a 1% increase in 
Cost of Funds would lead to an average increase of 0.0025% in Operational Self-
sufficiency. However, these results are contrary to empirical evidence and therefore 
requires further investigation. For instance Islam et al., (2014) hypothesized a significant 




an expense borne by an MFI when it borrows funds (Miller, 2013) and therefore is expected 
to negatively affect sustainability. 
 
On the other hand, Operating Expenses and Loan Loss provisions were found to have a 
negative relationship with Operational Self-sufficiency but their coefficients were 
statistically insignificant, thus signifying no evidence of long-run equilibrium relationship 
between them and OSS. However, the negative relationship is consistent with prior findings 
from literature such as Islam et al., (2014) and Kanake (2014) respectively. Both Operating 
Expenses and Loan Loss Provisions are direct costs and are therefore expected to negatively 
affect sustainability. Thus, a rise in these costs would lead to a decline in OSS since OSS is 
an indication of profitability (Yaron & Manos, 2010). 
 
4.7 Residual Diagnostics Results 
The results of the diagnostics of the ARDL model is presented in Table 4.7. The diagnostics 
include tests for serial correlation, heteroskedasticity, omitted variables, and normality.  
 
Table 4.7: Residual Diagnostics Results 
 
Serial Correlation test: Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: 
F-statistic 0.458537     Prob. F (2,14) 0.6414 
Obs*R-squared 2.336169     Prob. Chi-Square (2) 0.311 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
F-statistic 0.464894     Prob. F (21,16) 0.9495 
Obs*R-squared 14.40006     Prob. Chi-Square (21) 0.8518 
Scaled explained SS 2.146714     Prob. Chi-Square (21) 1.000 
Omitted Variable Test: RAMSEY RESET TEST  
t-statistic  1.926506     Probability    0.0732 
F-statistic  3.711425     Probability   0.0732 
Normality test: Jacque-Berra 
t-statistic 0.2348490     Probability  0.8892 
Skewness -0.108456    
Kurtosis 2.681772    
 
Source: EViews 9.5 output 
 
One of the common residual tests of serial correlation is the Breusch-Godfrey Langrange 
Multiplier (LM) test. The null hypothesis for the Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM 




from the above Serial Correlation LM test results is above the 5% significance level, the 
null hypothesis that the model has no serial correlation was accepted. 
 
Heteroscedasticity test results showed that the probability of Obs*R-squared was 85.18% 
which is more than 5%. Therefore, the null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity was 
accepted. In respect of the omitted variable test, a p-value of 7.32% from the Ramsey 
RESET test results was observed. This is not statistically significant since it is greater than 
the 5% level of significance. Hence, the null hypothesis for linearity could not be rejected, 
signifying that the model was appropriately specified. 
 
Although Gujarati (2012) noted that the JB test is a large sample test which may be 
inappropriate for small samples, the JB statistic of 0.23 and a p value of 0.89 for the 
residuals of the regression in this study signified that the assumption of normality of the 
error term was appropriate for the model despite having 43 observations. According to 
Gujarati (2012), the closer the JB value to zero, the better the normality assumption. 
 
According to Garson (2012), Skewness (the tilt or lack of it in the distribution) should be 
within the +2 to -2 range while Kurtosis (peakedness of the distribution) should be within 
the +3 to -3 range for normally distributed data. From table 4.7, the skewness value of -0.11 
and kurtosis value of 2.68 are very close to 0 and 3 respectively which further gives an 
indication that the data was normally distributed.  
 
4.8 Stability Diagnostics Results 
4.8.1 Cumulative Sum of Recursive Residuals Results 
Both the cumulative sum (CUSUM) and cumulative sum of squares (CUSUMQ) of 
recursive residuals tests were performed on the ECM to test the stability of short-run and 
long-run coefficient estimates. Figures 4.4 depicts both the CUSUM and CUSUMQ plots. 
The estimated coefficients are said to be stable if the CUSUM and CUSUMQ plots (blue 
line) stays within the bounds of the red lines (5% critical bounds). Both the CUSUM and 
CUSMQ plots shows that the model parameters are stable over the study period since the 
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Source: EViews 9.5 output 
 
 
4.9 Summary of Research Findings 
Trend analysis of the YGP showed a downward trend and consequently the OSS during the 
study period. The lowest YGP was recorded during the time ceilings were introduced. 
However, the low OSS prior to December 2006 requires investigation. 
 
The existence of a long run relationship between OSS and the independent variables was 
established through the ARDL bounds test. The ECM also indicated the presence of both 
short and long run relationships among the variables. In the short-run, Yield on Gross 
Portfolio, Operating Expenses, and Cost of Funds were found to influence OSS 
significantly. Yield on Gross Portfolio and Cost of Funds had a negative but significant 
relationship while Operating Expenses had a positive and significant relationship. In the 
long run relationship, Yield on Gross Portfolio and Cost of Funds were positively and 
significantly related to Operational Self-sufficiency. On the other hand, Operating Expenses 
and Loan Loss provisions were found to have a negative relationship with Operational Self-






CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter concludes the study on the Interest Rate Ceiling and Financial Sustainability 




The trend analysis of consolidated OSS showed that the MFIs were generally sustainable 
except between March 2014 and June 2014 when the sector became financially 
unsustainable following a gradual decline in OSS in the preceding months. This followed 
the introduction of interest rate ceiling and therefore can be attributed to inadequate revenue 
generated by the MFIs due to the ceiling. Among all the variables examined, the Yield on 
Gross Portfolio had the greatest influence on OSS. The positive and significant effect of 
Yield on Gross Portfolio on OSS in the long run confirmed the significance of interest 
income in relation to the sustainability of MFIs and also confirms findings from prior 
studies such as the findings of Cull et al. (2006), Iezza (2010), Marwa and Aziakpono 
(2015), and Nyamsogoro (2010) among others. The negative effect of Yield on Gross 
Portfolio in the short run could be attributed to the sensitivity of borrowers to interest rate 
increases (Karlan & Zinman, 2008; Dehejia et. al.,2012; Karlan & Zinman, 2016). 
According to Karlan and Zinman (2016), long-run elasticities may be different from short-
run elasticities. On the borrower side, it may take time for clients to learn about new rates 
and adjust their choice sets or production functions. Consequently, MFIs may not be able 
to generate enough revenue to cover costs in the short run. However, loan demand may 
recover in the long run (Dehejia et. al.,2012).  
 
The effect of direct costs (Operating Expenses, Cost of Funds, and Loan Loss Provision) 
on OSS in the short run were mixed, with Cost of Funds having a negative effect while 
Operating Expenses and Loan Loss had a positive effect contrary to expectation and thus 
required further investigation. However, the positive impact of Operating Expenses could 





In the long run relationship, Cost of Funds was found to have a positive influence while 
Operating Expenses and Loan Loss provisions were found to have a negative influence on 
OSS. The long run findings were in line with findings from prior studies except for the 
positive relationship between Cost of Funds and OSS which requires further investigation.  
 
Overall, the results of this study indicates that the Zambian microfinance sector was 
negatively impacted by the interest rate ceiling. This implies that interest rates must be set 
at levels were costs can be adequately covered. Thus, policy makers should avoid imposing 
interest rate ceilings in order to enable MFIs generate adequate revenue to cover their costs. 
This will in turn promote industry growth, microcredit supply, and financial sustainability. 
Authorities should consider alternative measures to stimulate lower interest rates such as 
controlling inflation, developing the financial infrastructure, and creating an environment 
that encourages entry of experienced investors to the industry thereby fostering 
competitiveness. Furthermore, managing costs and loan delinquency should be core 
priorities among Zambian MFIs to ensure financial sustainability. 
 
5.2 Recommendations for Future Research 
Based on this study, the following areas are recommended for future research 
 A research on the financial sustainability of individual regulated Zambian MFIs 
before, during and after the interest rate ceiling 
 A comparison of the financial sustainability between Consumer Lending and 
Enterprise lending Zambian MFIs before, during and after the interest rate ceiling 
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 Mar-06 20,286 10,787 4,648 2,674 1.12 Sep-11 91,747 41,653 11,293 7,323 1.52 
Jun-06 22,746 10,758 5,033 7,871 0.96 Dec-11 117,449 61,348 17,312 3,956 1.42 
Sep-06 31,883 15,428 6,607 1,917 1.33 Mar-12 105,686 53,512 14,426 1,614 1.52 
Dec-06 35,274 13,170 4,226 297 1.99 Jun-12 112,912 56,959 18,037 2,794 1.45 
Mar-07 40,356 17,001 5,397 3,390 1.56 Sep-12 136,324 75,437 22,539 7,910 1.29 
Jun-07 39,451 12,010 5,678 5,734 1.68 Dec-12 134,655 73,430 24,415 10,865 1.24 
Sep-07 52,995 16,067 7,690 4,540 1.87 Mar-13 135,621 60,784 28,591 30,042 1.14 
Dec-07 74,040 23,731 8,407 9,353 1.78 Jun-13 130,516 72,037 32,978 11,055 1.12 
Mar-08 61,089 21,876 9,022 4,459 1.73 Sep-13 184,188 97,330 38,013 14,753 1.23 
Jun-08 65,603 22,721 8,579 5,347 1.79 Dec-13 140,322 77,364 46,317 3,174 1.11 
Sep-08 74,091 22,194 9,648 7,757 1.87 Mar-14 132,454 82,625 57,193 2,928 0.93 
Dec-08 84,709 34,035 12,653 9,196 1.52 Jun-14 165,793 88,959 67,416 9,155 1.00 
Mar-09 86,477 38,389 13,592 4,069 1.54 Sep-14 218,681 103,099 76,282 22,725 1.08 
Jun-09 83,644 39,703 13,097 3,579 1.48 Dec-14 238,480 109,680 83,040 16,253 1.14 
Sep-09 80,036 31,108 14,073 281 1.76 Mar-15 227,773 102,469 90,917 4,173 1.15 
Dec-09 78,647 32,556 12,313 10,729 1.41 Jun-15 296,907 114,982 105,656 13,863 1.27 
Mar-10 72,904 48,472 11,853 2,509 1.16 Sep-15 274,260 114,692 103,224 19,699 1.15 
Jun-10 68,687 34,857 12,833 7,927 1.24 Dec-15 356,717 129,596 144,891 15,739 1.23 
Sep-10 74,468 38,962 10,220 -157 1.52 Mar-16 360,125 121,647 156,909 32,568 1.16 
Dec-10 78,661 42,704 12,462 5,103 1.31 Jun-16 395,401 156,146 163,636 31,321 1.13 
Mar-11 81,092 40,269 7,983 3,093 1.58 Sep-16 382,194 123,056 165,916 22,947 1.23 






























Mar-06 17.75%  Dec 08 23.86%  Sept 11 15.69%  Jun-14 6.97% 
Jun-06 20.20%  Mar-09 17.47%  Dec 11 20.50%  Sep-14 8.32% 
Sep-06 25.90%  June 09 17.16%  Mar 12 11.87%  Dec-14 9.23% 
Dec-06 26.15%  Sept 09 15.79%  Jun-12 12.61%  Mar-15 7.80% 
Mar-07 17.05%  Dec 09 14.65%  Sept 12 15.41%  Jun-15 8.85% 
Jun-07 17.91%  Mar 10 16.86%  Dec 12 14.77%  Sep-15 8.95% 
Sept 07 21.98%  Jun 10 15.54%  Mar 13 7.43%  Dec-15 10.14% 
Dec 07 28.39%  Sept 10 15.93%  Jun-13 5.83%  Mar-16 9.22% 
Mar-08 15.86%  Dec 10 17.26%  Sep-13 8.54%  Jun-16 9.61% 
Jun-08 16.95%  Mar 11 14.63%  Dec-13 9.29%  Sep-16 10.15% 





Table III: ARDL Model 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.*   
C 0.603636 0.19048 3.169022 0.006 
OSS(-1) 0.138619 0.195583 0.708749 0.4887 
OSS(-2) -0.235352 0.186056 -1.26496 0.224 
OSS(-3) -0.146712 0.129874 -1.12965 0.2753 
YGP 1.120303 0.8261 1.356134 0.1939 
YGP(-1) 2.231411 0.991223 2.251171 0.0388 
YGP(-2) 0.839045 0.811733 1.033647 0.3167 
YGP(-3) 3.244869 0.731679 4.434826 0.0004 
LL -2.92E-06 4.28E-06 -0.6811 0.5055 
LL(-1) -1.74E-06 3.97E-06 -0.43747 0.6676 
LL(-2) 3.03E-07 3.73E-06 0.081127 0.9363 
LL(-3) 7.47E-06 4.55E-06 1.642652 0.12 
LL(-4) -5.27E-06 4.72E-06 -1.11644 0.2807 
DOE -1.68E-06 3.42E-06 -0.49199 0.6294 
DOE(-1) -3.65E-06 4.16E-06 -0.87557 0.3942 
DOE(-2) -1.62E-06 4.07E-06 -0.39832 0.6957 
DOE(-3) -5.52E-06 3.13E-06 -1.76565 0.0965 
DCF 4.69E-06 3.34E-06 1.404419 0.1793 
DCF(-1) 1.37E-06 4.90E-06 0.278801 0.784 
DCF(-2) 2.03E-06 6.09E-06 0.332934 0.7435 
DCF(-3) 1.01E-05 5.33E-06 1.902026 0.0753 
DCF(-4) 1.31E-05 9.56E-06 1.366112 0.1908 
R-squared 0.917919     Mean dependent var 1.371387 
Adjusted R-squared 0.810187     S.D. dependent var 0.256292 
S.E. of regression 0.11166     Akaike info criterion -1.253819 
Sum squared resid 0.199487     Schwarz criterion -0.305743 
Log likelihood 45.82257     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.916501 
F-statistic 8.520438     Durbin-Watson stat 2.227099 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000033 Observations  38 
Note: Selected Model: ARDL (3, 3, 4, 3, 4) 
 
